JPRS 78635

30 July 1981

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1606

MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL

No. 1, January 1981

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

JPRS 78635

30 July 1981

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1606

MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL

No. 1, JANUARY 1981

CONTENTS

Contents of 'Military Historical Journal,' January 1981..... 1

Defense of the Homeland: Historical Basis Reviewed..... 3

Wartime Operations: Organizing and Planning Cooperation..... 10

Wartime Operations: Defensive Counterstrikes..... 19

Wartime Operations: Employment of Submarines..... 28

Wartime Operations: Tank Army Rear Services Support..... 34

Wartime Operations: Reconnaissance in a Rifle Division..... 43

Wartime Operations: Rifle Battalion in Defensive Combat..... 49

Wartime Operations: Army Operations in the Far East..... 55

Wartime Operations: Naval Support of Ground Troops..... 65

Comments of Midget Submarines..... 69

Social Control of Military Collectives Discussed..... 71

Role of Military Archives in Research Work..... 77

Review of Book on Zionism..... 82

Review of Book on Military History Research..... 86

Mailbag of the 'Military Historical Journal' for 1980..... 88

CONTENTS OF 'MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL,' JANUARY 1981

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 p 2

[Articles translated in their entirety in this report are indicated with an asterisk (*); an article from which excerpts have been translated is indicated with a double asterisk (**)]

[Text] CONTENT Page

TOWARD THE 26th CPSU CONGRESS

*"V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Historical Responsibility for the Security of the Socialist Fatherland" - V. Khrobostov and V. Iliyevskiy 3

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Operational Art

*"Methods of Planning and Organizing Cooperation When Preparing for Front and Army Operations" - P. Lashchenko and N. Kamanichev 9
*"From the Experience of Conducting Counterstrikes on the Defensive" - A. Maryshev and V. Iminov 17
*"Improving the Combat Employment of Submarines Based on the Experience of 1943-1945 Operations" - V. Dmitriyev 25
*"Rear Services Support for the First Guards Tank Army in the L'wow-Sandomierz Operation" - I. Karpushin 30

TACTICS

*"Operations of a Reconnaissance Detachment" - R. Frolov 37
*"Defensive Combat of a Rifle Battalion" - V. Timofeyev 41

MEMOIRS

*"In the Hills of Manchuria" - A. Beloborodov 45

Page

MILITARY LEADERS AND GENERALS

"Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov" 52

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL

*"Cooperation of Naval Artillery with the Ground Forces" - G. Ammon 55

IN THE FOREIGN ARMIES

**"Combat Operations of Midget Submarines in the Pacific Theater of Military Operations in World War II" - A. Pushkin 57

AGAINST THE BOURGEOIS FALSIFIERS OF HISTORY

"On the Question of the Reactionary Essence of the Views of the Military Leaders of Germany (1919-1933)" - K. Nuss 63

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS

"The Development of Radio Communications in the Russian Navy in 1900-1905" - A. Bul' and D. Tribel'skiy 71
*"The Primary Military Collective as an Object of Research and Social Control" - A. Vasilevskiy 75

Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Youth

"Tutorship Tested by Life" - D. Kuznetsov 79

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE STUDY

*"On the Role of Military Archives in Scientific Research and Military History Work" - O. Gurov 82

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

*"The Truth About Zionism" - V. Karnoukhov 86
*"The Dialectics of Military History Research" - M. Galkin 89
*"From the Editor's Mailbag" 90

CURRENT EVENTS, FACTS AND FINDINGS 93

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND: HISTORICAL BASIS REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 3-8

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col V. Khrobostov and Lt Col V. Iliyevskiy: "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Historical Responsibility for the Security of the Socialist Fatherland"]

[Text] The Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" points out that the USSR has consistently carried out a program of fighting for peace and international cooperation, for the liberty and independence of peoples and for a lessening of international tension. The influence of the USSR on the course of world events has been continuously growing. And no matter how the aggressive imperialist circles endeavor to pressure the USSR and the positions of socialism as a whole, no matter how they try to isolate our country, their actions in this area misfire. "To a decisive degree," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "this is due to the fact that the economic potential and defense might of the Soviet nation have increased immeasurably and the sociopolitical and ideological unity of our society has become even stronger."[1] Due to the wise Leninist policy and to the constant concern of the party and the government, the world's first socialist state during the years of its existence has so grown and become stronger and its defense might has become so strengthened that, as was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the Soviet people can be confident that the fruits of their creative labor are dependably protected."[2]

The necessity of defending the socialist fatherland is an objective pattern in the construction of socialism and communism. "Any revolution," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "is worth something only when it is able to defend itself...."[3] This conclusion has been profoundly established and thoroughly concretized in many of Lenin's works where various aspects of military organizational development are examined. Lenin created an ordered teaching about the defense of the socialist fatherland and this has undergone further development and embodiment in the subsequent activities of the CPSU. It is a fixed basis for the military policy of the Communist Party directed at the greatest possible rise in the defense capability of the nation and the combat readiness of its Army and Navy. The necessity of constantly maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces on the proper level has been historically determined. From the very first days of its existence, the Soviet nation was forced to fend off rabid attacks by the united forces of international imperialism and the domestic enemies.

V. I. Lenin sharply posed the question of the responsibility of each person for the destiny of the socialist motherland. He wrote: "The most important thing is to achieve personal responsibility."[4] Profound thoughts on the essence, significance and ways of indoctrinating people in this spirit are to be found in many works of V. I. Lenin, and above all those such as "What Are the 'Friends of the People' and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats?", "What is to be Done?", "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," "Everything into the Struggle Against Denikin!", "The Party Organization and Party Literature," "For Combating the Fuel Crisis" and "The Socialist Party and Nonparty Revolutionariness." Lenin demanded the establishing of "the most precise responsibility of each person of the individuals holding any Soviet position or carrying out definite, clearly and unambiguously outlined tasks and practical work."[5]

The content of responsibility was determined by the nature of the corresponding social relations. For each socioeconomic formation there is a corresponding, definite type of responsibility which incorporates the basic traits inherent to the representatives of the ruling class. On this level the responsibility of a citizen from a socialist society differs fundamentally from the responsibility of a representative from a capitalist society. Under capitalism, in line with the social inequality, the responsibility of the individual has a sharply expressed antagonistic class character. In the expression of K. Marx, each person is concerned only with himself and would never be concerned with anyone else.[6] But under the conditions of socialism, the nature of responsibility is determined by the coinciding of the fundamental social and personal interests. Socialism has eliminated the irreconcilable contradictions between the individual and society and for the first time created conditions for a practical solution to the problem of responsibility.

Under the conditions of a military organization, of particular significance is the question of the role of the organizer and leader, the indoctrinator-commander and his responsibility. V. I. Lenin constantly focused attention on the fact that we "need both one-man responsibility and one-man efficiency" and we require such an organizing of the matter "that one could not escape from responsibility."[7]

As the CPSU Program defines, one-man leadership is the most important principle in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its essence is in the sole responsibility of the commander for troop control. He, as the sole commander, bears full personal responsibility both for the decision taken and for carrying it out. One-man leadership based on a party foundation holds a leading place in the process of the executive and decision-taking activities in the units and ships.

Along with the principles of centralized leadership and military discipline, it permeates the entire system of the Soviet military organization. An officer's responsibility is expressed primarily in a highly-aware attitude, in a state and party approach to the assigned job, in a Bolshevik intolerance of shortcomings and indifference in work, a profound awareness of one's responsibilities in indoctrinating the personnel and in the ability to provide an objective assessment of one's activities. An elucidation of this necessity as the main leading principle and the subordination of intellectual and moral qualities and organizing abilities to the cause of the indoctrination and training of the personnel are a vivid manifestation of the high responsibility of the officer personnel for the assigned job. The responsibility for carrying out the tasks confronting the Soviet people was also brought up

at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that "a rise in the level of economic work and the indoctrination of the cadres in professionalism, responsibility and initiative remain an indispensable condition for production successes."[8]

The responsibility of an individual to the collective means his carrying out of service (party) duties and rights and the manifestation of such qualities as political awareness, high party loyalty and principledness, discipline and efficiency, competence and activeness in sociopolitical life. The responsibility of the collective for the worker is expressed in the fact that it has an indoctrinational influence on all members.

The responsible nature of military service in the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the fact that the Army and Navy of our state must protect the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people, defend the freedom and independence of the motherland and the victories of Great October, together with the fraternal armies ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth and be a dependable bulwark of universal peace in remaining constantly in a state of high military readiness.

Military responsibility is based upon a communist attitude toward military service, a high feeling of duty and a constant desire for military improvement. Responsibility for the security of the socialist fatherland, like the other types of security, is an effective incentive for the conscientious fulfillment of military obligations, since precisely this feeling impels one to be responsible for the quality and results of the military and political training to the collective of the subunit, unit or ship.

Responsibility, in being based on a close interaction of both social and psychological elements, includes: 1) an awareness by the serviceman of his role in ensuring the security of the motherland and the necessity of acting in accord with the requirements of the party aimed at strengthening the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces and maintaining them in high, constant combat readiness; 2) unflagging control over one's own actions considering their consequences both for oneself and for the military collective, self-accountability and self-assessment (self-monitoring); 3) socially active undertakings. For this reason, it is impossible to understand responsibility solely as a sum of any standards of principles. It operates as an awareness on the part of a serviceman of his role and significance in military service and is a measure of his activeness in military improvement.

At a meeting of the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, emphasized: "It must always be remembered that it is not enough for a serviceman to say: you must be disciplined and efficient; he must be put under conditions of strict military order and the proper organization of combat training and all the life of the unit or subunit and see to it that the responsibility of each person for personal conduct becomes actual."[9]

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" obliges the party and Komsomol organizations "to inculcate in the younger generation a feeling of historic responsibility for the fate of socialism and for the flourishing and security of the motherland."[10]

The further development of the Armed Forces and the necessity of their constant combat readiness demand higher moral-political and psychological preparation of all the personnel and particularly the officers, the role of whom has continuously risen under present-day conditions. The greater responsibility of the commanders for carrying out the tasks of political and military indoctrination of the personnel is predetermined primarily by the fact that communist indoctrination of the nation's workers and the men of the Army and Navy is a most important pattern of communist construction. The successes of the servicemen in military and political training, combat readiness and morale depend upon the level of ideological influence on each soldier and upon the ability of the officers in a skilled and effective manner to carry out the political and military indoctrination of the men. The member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, has demanded attaining a position whereby each commander and political worker is perfectly aware of what new moral, physical and psychological trials will be encountered by our soldier in modern combat as well as what margin of military, ideological and moral strength is needed even in peacetime in preparing the defenders of the motherland. Ideologically convinced, expertly handling the weapons entrusted to him and morally prepared to endure all hardships for the sake of victory, "man has been and remains the decisive strength in war."[11]

The increased responsibility of the military in the present stage of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the present international situation. Due to the efforts of the Soviet Union which has consistently and effectively carried out the Peace Program elaborated by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses as well as to the efforts of the entire socialist commonwealth and the other peace-loving states, in the 1970's it was possible to achieve a turn toward a lessening of tension and the development of mutually advantageous trade, economic and cultural cooperation between countries with different social systems. But at the start of the 1980's, the situation in the world took a marked turn for the worse. The United States and its NATO partners, in endeavoring to check the progressive changes, have carried out a policy of strengthening the arms race and have undertaken various provocations against the socialist and nonaligned states. They have endeavored, as L. I. Brezhnev said, in speaking before the members of parliament in India, "to disrupt the balance of forces existing in the world and from positions of military superiority impose their will on the peoples."[11a] The partnership of imperialism and Chinese hegemonism represents a great danger. The June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out that the intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace require constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of the defense capability of our state. The exacerbation of the international situation, the complicating of the tasks of military organizational development and the increased demands upon the combat readiness of the Army and Navy necessitate a further rise in the role of the Communist Party in directing the activities of the Armed Forces. The party gives particularly great attention to the political indoctrination of the personnel and to constantly improving the forms and methods of work by the party and Komsomol organizations of the units and ships to develop in the personnel a high sense of responsibility for the security of the motherland. In successfully carrying out these tasks an important role is played by the personal example set by the communists. They unite the ranks of the nonparty persons and lead them on.

During the years of harsh testing, when the question of the life and death of our state was being settled, the Soviet people and their military demonstrated

unprecedented examples of moral-political unity, class awareness and an understanding of their historic responsibility for the revolutionary victories and destiny of the socialist motherland.

At present the Army and Navy personnel headed by the communists are continuously improving their military skills. The Soviet Armed Forces dependably guard the creative labor of the builders of socialism and communism. They, as V. I. Lenin admonished, are always on guard. "All the acquired experience," said L. I. Brezhnev at a ceremony in Moscow devoted to the presentation of the Lenin prize to him, "the existing international situation and particularly recent facts oblige us to keep our powder dry, to be steadfast and consistent in defending the cause of peace and to recall our historic responsibility for the fate of the motherland and all mankind."[13]

The USSR Constitution has profoundly disclosed the high calling of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state, the truly popular character, the truly humane and noble essence of their activities. Created for the purposes of protecting socialist victories, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation, the USSR Armed Forces must be constantly in combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff of any aggressor. Article 62 of the Basic Law states: "A USSR citizen must protect the interests of the Soviet state and help to strengthen its might and authority. The defense of the socialist fatherland is a sacred duty of each USSR citizen."

In the leading units, the work of instilling responsibility for the security of the socialist fatherland is carried out continuously both in the process of ideological and political indoctrination and in the course of combat duty, combat training, guard, garrison and internal service. In this regard a special role is assigned to rocket launches, to exercises with field firing, marches and sea cruises. The highest degree of responsibility is demanded from the servicemen by alert duty which in peacetime is the carrying out of a combat mission to safeguard the integrity of our frontiers. The commanders, political bodies and party organizations mobilize the men to the strict and precise observance of the requirements of the CPSU and the minister of defense for raising combat readiness and organizing alert duty; for careful preparations of the weapons, equipment and combat control facilities as well as the crews and teams; studying the probable enemy, maintaining discipline, organization, vigilance and particularly ensuring the highest combat readiness of the duty equipment and crews. "The Soviet Armed Forces as a whole, each formation and each troop unit," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "should be constantly in a state of that readiness which would exclude for the aggressor even the slightest opportunity to catch us unaware...the combat readiness of the troops is a concentrated expression of the enormous efforts and material outlays by the people on equipping the army, of the awareness, military skills and discipline of all servicemen, the art of command personnel in troop control and much else. This, ultimately, is the crown of troop military skill in peacetime and the key to victory in a war."[14]

All ideological-political, indoctrinational and organizational work by the military councils, the political bodies, commanders, party and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy is aimed at rallying the personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces, developing their high moral-political and military qualities and at making certain that each

servicemen is aware that he is personally responsible for the defense of the motherland.

The indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces is enormous. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev spoke strongly about this at the 25th CPSU Congress. He emphasized that "our army is indoctrinated in a spirit of profound loyalty to the socialist motherland, to the ideas of peace and internationalism and to the ideas of friendship among peoples."[15] The Soviet military is profoundly aware of its responsibility for the security of its fatherland and the entire socialist commonwealth and vigilantly guards peace and communist construction.

One of the most important conditions for the readiness of the men to thwart any aggressive actions by our enemies is their unswerving execution of the requirements of the regulations, orders and instructions, the maintaining of iron military discipline and the showing of unflagging vigilance.

On the threshold of the 26th CPSU Congress, the socialist competition has developed widely in the Army and Navy to properly celebrate it. The daily military service of the men shows their high patriotic desire to raise the combat readiness of the ships and units to a new, higher level. Great indoctrinational opportunities of Army and Navy service reside in the troop collectives. In the work of unifying them, it is essential to create a moral climate which would contribute to the successful carrying out of the tasks of combat training and to strengthening organization and proper order. The personnel is positively influenced also by well organized routine and by the entire way of Army and Navy life which is subordinate to carrying out the main task of preparing ideologically tempered able defenders of the socialist fatherland.

In ideological indoctrination great significance is given to developing international awareness in the men. Internationalism which is an indispensable quality of the Soviet soldier is being presently further developed in the course of deepening and broadening ties with the peoples and men of the armies in the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

The scale and complexity of the tasks confronting the Armed Forces make it necessary for each officer to take an active part in carrying them out and to fulfill the orders in the asigned area with a maximum straining of forces and with the greatest return.

Today's military are the worthy heirs of the heroic deeds of the older generations. They are honorably continuing and adding to the traditions of the Armed Forces, they are serving the motherland wholeheartedly and with dedication, and by achieving high indicators in the precongress competition are demonstrating their high responsibility for the security of the socialist fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

2. "Materialy XXV S"vezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83.

3. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 122.

4. Ibid., Vol 53, p 301.

5. Ibid., Vol 37, p 365.

6. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 23, p 187.

7. See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, pp 428-429.

8. PRAVDA, 22 October 1980.

9. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 June 1980.

10. "O Dal'neyshem Uluchshenii Ideologicheskoy, Politiko-Vospitatel'noy Raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 Aprelya 1979 Goda" [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 14.

11. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 37.

11a. PRAVDA, 11 December 1980.

13. PRAVDA, 1 April 1980.

14. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 137.

15. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 76.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: ORGANIZING AND PLANNING COOPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 9-16

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Operational Art" by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen P. Lashchenko, and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col N. Ramanichev: "Methods of Planning and Organizing Cooperation When Preparing for Front and Army Operations"]

[Text] Actions that are coordinated in terms of tasks (objectives), sectors, lines (areas) and time by the formations and units of the different armed services and branches of troops in the interests of achieving the common objective of an operation have always been an objective necessity. The Great Patriotic War provided rich experience in the close cooperation of the infantry, tanks, artillery, special troops, aviation, partisans and naval forces in the course of their carrying out of combat missions. Here the organizing of cooperation was not a separate measure. It was an inseparable part of the activities of the command, the staffs and troops preparing the operation. To one degree or another the coordinating of actions was reflected in the commander's plan, in the setting of the missions and in the instructions on the procedure and sequence of carrying them out, during the planning of the operation, reconnaissance and the operational and combat training of the generals, officers, staffs and troops. The article briefly examines the experience of the war in the area of planning and organizing cooperation in the preparation of the field forces for offensive operations.[1]

The planning of cooperation was carried out in the fronts and armies on a basis of the received task, the instructions of the superior staff and the commander's plan. This was reflected in the plan of the operation, in the orders and instructions to the troops and in an army, in addition, in the textual plan for cooperation or in the planning table for combat. These did not differ from one another in terms of their content. The procedure of cooperation among the troops to a depth of the immediate task was planned in detail and to a further depth in general outlines. The operations of the formations and units of the combined-arms armies were coordinated with particular care in terms of the task, objectives, lines and time for the period of breaking through the tactical defensive zone, that is, for the first day of an offensive. In the tank armies in many instances this was done to the entire depth of the operation. For example, in October 1941, the staff of the 3d Guards Tank Army compiled a detailed plan of an operation to destroy the Kiev grouping of Nazi troops and a plan for cooperation with aviation for the 5 days of the offensive.[2]

In addition, combat planning tables were sometimes worked out for the individual stages of an operation. These were related to the capturing of the most important objectives (lines). Or there were written instructions on cooperation (the instructions of the commander of the 3d Assault Army, Col Gen V. I. Kuznetsov, for organizing and carrying out an attack on the enemy forward defensive edge by the formations of the army during the Berlin Operation[3]).

The elaborated cooperation plan or the combat planning table were often adjusted in the course of organizing combat operations, as was done by the commander of the 8th Guards Army, Col Gen V. I. Chuykov, in preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation. Some 5-6 days prior to the offensive, he conducted reconnaissance and a playthrough of the forthcoming actions on a terrain model, and then made corrections in the planning table.[4] After its approval, the army staff made copies for the commanders of the formations. On the basis of the received mission and these copies, planning was started in the divisions and the army and attached units.

The cooperation procedures for the combined-arms armies and the tank armies incorporated in their areas were drawn up in a separate plan or planning table. These coordinated the efforts of the formations, the artillery, the engineer troops and supporting aviation prior to the carrying out of the first day's task by the tank army. In these instances the operations of the basic branches of troops were made in most detail. Thus, in the Berlin Operation (1945) the plan worked out in addition by the staffs of the 3d Guards Tank Army and the 3d Guards Army (chiefs of staff, Maj Gen Tank Trps V. A. Mitrofanov and Maj Gen N. N. Zelinskiy) defined the cooperation procedures between the tank troops and the artillery of the 3d Guards Army during the period of their committing to battle. In this plan, the tank and gun crews were instructed as to what was to be carried out when and how on each of the 10 designated lines.[5]

Cooperation in an air corps was planned for each one and for the supported combined-arms and tank formations (the 2d Air Army with the 38th, 40th and 3d Guards Tank Armies in the Kiev Operation of October 1943). By the war's end, there was the practice of planning cooperation not for the entire air army but rather for its individual formations which would be used for supporting one or another combined-arms or tank army. For example, in preparing for the Berlin Operation, in the 8th Guards Army (chief of staff, Maj Gen V. A. Belyavskiy, together with the staffs of the air formations, five independent plans were worked out: with the IX Ground Attack and VI Bomber Air Corps, the 118th, 221st and 242d Bomber Air Divisions.[6] In a similar manner cooperation was planned between the 1st Guards Tank Army and the III Fighter, IX Ground Attack and VI Bomber Air Corps and the 188th and 221st Bomber Air Divisions.[7]

The cooperation plans for aviation determined the methods of action and the procedure for calling in aircraft to the battlefield and established the identification and target designation signals and the uniform call tables. These figured the daily load factor for the air formations assigned for support and cover. During the third period of the war, particularly during the operations of 1945, schedule plans were drawn up for air and artillery assaults and these were aimed at the closest coordination of air and artillery actions.

There was also the practice of working out combat planning tables (cooperation plans) for the combined-arms formations with naval forces (the 33d Army and the 3d Launch

Brigade of the Dnepr Flotilla in capturing the city of Furstenberg and the hydraulic engineering works on the Oder-Spree Canal on the eve of the Berlin Operation.)[8]

In the documents which coordinated the efforts of the ground forces with airborne assault parties (in the zones of the Western and Kalinin fronts during the winter of 1941-1942 and the Voronezh Front in the autumn of 1943), main attention was given to establishing the contact lines and time and the identification signals. In planning the landing of an airborne assault force by the 1st Baltic Front in the region of Polotsk (November 1943), its actions with the partisan detachments were coordinated with particular care. For this an operations group of the front staff was organized and this included representatives also from the airborne troops.

The commanders of the combined-arms formations and their staffs gained rich experience in organizing cooperation with the partisans. There was a well-proven practice of having a systematic air visit to partisan bases by the representatives of the fronts of the staffs and armies. Thus, in November 1943, the representatives from the staff of the 65th Army made ten such air visits to exchange data and clarify questions of cooperation with the partisan formations. On 8 December a joint meeting was held involving the deputy army commander, the commander of the XVIII Rifle Corps, divisional commanders and the commanders and commissars of two partisan brigades. Specific plans for the forthcoming engagements were drawn up.

Thus, the planning of cooperation comprised an inseparable part in the work of the commanders and staffs of the field forces in preparing for an operation and served as a basis for organizing the most efficient use of the combat capabilities of all the men and equipment involved in the operation.

As an analysis of the archival wartime documents indicates, the cooperation plans (combat planning tables) depicted in detail one of the most probable variations of actions by the troops of the field forces in each stage of the operation (the occupying of the jump-off position, the attack on the forward edge, the development of the offensive, the capturing of the second position, pursuit and so forth). Such a document was rarely correlated to a map and was ordinarily very cumbersome and inconvenient for use under field conditions. There was also the graphic compilation of the coordination plans (on maps).

The organization of cooperation was one of the major tasks for the commanders of the field forces in preparing an operation. As experience was acquired, the coordination of the efforts of the troops on the terrain became required. This work was carried out in reconnaissance during which the actions of the troops were coordinated within the visible expanse, that is, as a rule, to a shallow depth. However, the increased scope of the operations and the involvement of a large number of mobile troops and aviation in them required that the questions of cooperation be settled to a greater depth. This was achieved by conducting exercises on a terrain model which reproduced the troop groupings of the sides and this was designed with particular detail to the depth of the immediate task.

During the third period of the war, command and staff exercises and command games on maps began to be widely held. Efforts were then coordinated to the entire depth of the operation. Such a game in the First Belorussian Front (commander, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov) on the eve of the Berlin Operation was held during the period from 5 through

7 April 1945. Participating in it were the commanders, the chiefs of the army staffs and members of the military councils, the chief of the front political directorate, the artillery commanders of the front and the armies, other chiefs of the branches of troops, special troops and rear services of the front and the commanders of all individual corps.[9] In preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation, in the 2d Guards Tank Army (commander, Col Gen Tank Trps S. I. Bogdanov), in addition to the command and staff exercises, a radio exercise was also held. Involved in it were representatives of the adjacent 1st Guards Tank Army and the 5th Assault Army in the area of which the 2d Guards Tank Army was to be committed to the battle, as well as the command of the VI Ground Attack and III Fighter Air Corps which according to the plan of the operation were to be used for supporting its formations.[10]

The working out of situational inputs was the basic method for organizing cooperation on the terrain and in its models and maps. The commanders and staffs as it were created and adjusted the model for the forthcoming operation considering the possible nature of enemy actions. With the highly skilled training of the commander and staff, the organizing of cooperation by playing through variations of possible actions did not require great expenditures of time while producing a significant effect.

When necessary and if time was available, in the front games were conducted with the command of the armies operating in the sectors of the frontal thrusts. Thus, prior to the Vistula-Oder Operation in the 1st Belorussian Front, from 8 through 10 December 1944, a command game was organized with all the army commanders, and on 4 January 1945, for establishing closer cooperation between the groupings fighting from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads, at the command post of the 69th Army of Lt Gen V. Ya. Kolpakchi, a similar measure was held for the commanders of the formations of the 69th Army, the commanders of the 1st and 2d Guards Tank armies and the 8th Guards and 5th Assault armies with their chiefs of staff.[11]

After conducting the organizational work, the commanders and the staffs controlled the course of troop preparations for the operation and helped them, paying great attention to working out the questions of cooperation. For example, several days prior to the start of the L'vov-Sandomir Operation the 322d Rifle Division[12] was visited by the commanders of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Mar SU I. S. Konev, and of the 60th Army, Col Gen P. A. Kurochkin.

I. S. Konev demanded that the divisional commander report all the data concerning the enemy in the area of his offensive as well as the battle plan and the procedure for organizing cooperation between the infantry, the artillery, tanks and aviation. Here he went into the smallest detail and provided much useful advice and instructions for the divisional commander. Ivan Stepanovich [Konev] also carried out similar work in the other formations operating in the sector of the main thrust.

The commander of the 5th Army, Col Gen N. I. Krylov, in traveling to the formations, involved a large number of army staff officers in their work. In one of the regiments of each division in the most detailed manner he analyzed the organizational plan for the forthcoming battle and saw to it that all the subunit commanders had correctly analyzed their tasks and the ways for carrying them out. Then he ordered the divisional commander to do the same thing in the remaining regiments while he himself went on to other formations. Nikolay Ivanovich [Krylov] devoted particularly great attention to the questions of cooperation.

In supervising the course of preparations for the operation, the commanders created various situational inputs and listened to the decisions of the subordinate commanders on them. In the event of a shortage of time, as a rule, they restricted themselves to reconnaissance and brief meetings at which they gave their subordinates their tasks and generally outlined and worked through the cooperation questions. Thus, in the preparations for the Berlin Operation, the commander of the 2d Belorussian Front, Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy, restricted himself to cooperation instructions during reconnaissance and in the orders to the armies for the operation.

There was also a practice of holding meetings with the command of those troops which were to fight in the sector of the main thrust. Thus, in the preparations for the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Army Gen N. F. Vatutin, on 1 August 1943, invited to the command post of the 5th Guards Army (commander, Lt Gen A. S. Zhadov) the commanders of the adjacent 6th Guards Army, Lt Gen N. M. Chistyakov, and of the 5th Guards and 1st Tank armies, Lt Gens Tank Trps P. A. Rotmistrov and M. Ye. Katukov, the formations of which were to be committed to battle in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, in addition to the commander of the 2d Air Army, Lt Gen Avn S. A. Krasovskiy. During the day, N. F. Vatutin coordinated the procedure of actions for each of these formations to the depth of the immediate task. Prior to the Prague Operation which started virtually without a pause for the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Mar SU I. S. Konev restricted himself to just a brief meeting which he held on 4 May 1945 at his command post, having heard the plans of the army commanders and having given instructions for cooperation. These basically came down to a general coordination of actions between the armies in terms of the tasks, lines and time.[13]

Thus, the commander of the front (army) was the chief organizer of cooperation among the troops in an operation. However, the great importance of cooperation and its role in achieving objectives not only in front and army but often strategic operations frequently led to a situation where the process of organizing cooperation was carried out under conditions of high centralization when representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command [HqSHC] took a direct part in coordinating the efforts of the fronts, the armies and even the formations fighting in the sector of the main thrust. For example, in preparing the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, cooperation between the Don and Southwestern fronts was organized by the representative of HqSHC, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov. As the former commander of the Don Front, Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy, recalled this: "On 3 November a group of staff officers and I were summoned to a meeting in the area of the 21st Army.... The meeting was held by G. K. Zhukov. Present here were the army commanders and divisional commanders who were to advance in the sector of the main thrust. Particular attention was given to coordination of the adjacent units on the boundaries of the fronts."[14]

When closer coordination was required and depending upon the importance of the operation, the representatives of HqSHC took an active part in organizing cooperation not only between the troops of the adjacent fronts but also within one of the field forces. Thus, in the course of the Kiev Operation, on 1 November 1943, at the staff of the 38th Army, a meeting was held involving the commanders of the corps, divisions and brigades (including the commander of the Czechoslovak brigade L. Svoboda), the chiefs of the political sections and the corresponding artillery commanders. It was

held by the commander of the front, Arm Gen N. F. Vatutin in the presence of Mar SU G. K. Zhukov and the members of the military councils of the front and the armies. "...On maps we worked out the operation and clarified the procedure for carrying out the tasks by the army troops. Those present reported on everything relating to cooperation and then traveled out to the formations in order to recheck their plans on the spot and give tasks to the troops," recalled the former commander of the 38th Army, now Mar SU K. S. Moskalenko.[15]

However, it must be pointed out that such a high degree of centralization in organizing cooperation was characteristic only for the first and second periods of the war. In the third, as the commanders of the fronts and armies gained experience in preparing and conducting an operation, the need for this declined, although in the Berlin Operation centralization in the organization of cooperation by HqSHC and the General Staff was highly apparent. This was explained by the fact that the Berlin Operation was the last and special operation in defeating Nazi Germany and its unconditional surrender.

In the coordinating of efforts by adjacent units, the personal contacts of the commanders of the field forces were of great importance. The former commander of the Volkhov Front, Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, recalled that in preparing for the Operation "Iskra" [Spark], he twice (in November 1942 and January 1943) met with the commander of the Leningrad Front, L. A. Govorov. They coordinated the questions of the resources to be allocated for the operation, the sectors for the thrusts of the troops, the lines of their linking up, the cooperation signals and so forth.[17] This method was employed particularly frequently and was actually the basic one in organizing cooperation between the field forces and formations of the various branches of troops and armed services. As a result the commanders and staff representatives outlined the cooperation principles which were later reflected in plans. Moreover, joint reconnaissance and various sorts of games and exercises were conducted.

With the presence of pauses in operations, the questions of cooperation were worked out in the course of the combat training of the troops even prior to receiving the mission for the operation. This work in the form of exercises, assemblies, meetings and drills was basically carried out on the tactical level and aimed at achieving cohesiveness in the cooperating subunits, units and staffs considering the real enemy opposing the given formation or unit and the nature of the terrain. Thus, in the preparations for the L'vov-Sandomir Operation by the 1st Ukrainian Front in the 322d Rifle Division long before the receiving of the mission for the offensive, with the subunits, officers and the staffs of all the branches of troops, exercises were organized on the offensive questions considering all the particular features of the enemy defenses and the terrain conditions ahead of the division's front. Particularly great attention was given here to the combat cohesiveness of the rifle companies and battalions. As a rule, operating with them were subunits of reinforcements, including tank, artillery, mortar and engineer.

In the work of the commanders and staffs in organizing cooperation, as in all their activities related to organizing combat operations, two basic methods can be established: parallel and successive. The first was employed, as a rule, under conditions of limited time to prepare the operation. It occurred most often in the tank armies in the course of the front operations. The essence of this method can be traced from the example of the 65th Army which had around 4 days to organize an offensive in the Berlin Operation. In the course of the regrouping of the army from

the area of Danzig to the line of the Oder River, its commander, Col Gen P. I. Batov, along with the corps commanders and a group of officers from the field headquarters conducted reconnaissance in the area of the forthcoming offensive and gave the missions to subordinates, having indicated the cooperation procedure for the basic stages of the operation. The corps commanders, on the basis of the obtained instructions, immediately began to work with the divisional commanders, while the army commanders traveled to the adjacent 2d assault and 70th armies, coordinating the questions of cooperation with their commanders, Col Gens I. I. Fedyuninskiy and V. S. Popov. At the same time, at the command post of the 65th Army, the deputy commander of the 4th Air Army coordinated the procedure for carrying out the mission by the air formations in the interests of the ground troops, while the staff of the combined-arms army worked out a combat planning table and a separate coordination plan for the period of the crossing of the Oder.[19] Thus, virtually all command elements of the army troops were involved simultaneously in the work.

The successive method of organizing and planning cooperation can be illustrated by the example of the 37th Army. In preparing for the Iasi-Kishinev Operation in the summer of 1944, its staff allocated 8 days for organizing cooperation. Prior to the reconnaissance sortie, a draft cooperation planning table was worked out. On the basis of it, on 9 August, the army commander, Lt Gen M. N. Sharokhin, conducted reconnaissance with the commanders and chiefs of staff of the rifle corps and divisions and the VII Guards Mechanized Corps which was to be committed to battle in the area of the army, and with the chief of staff of the 17th Air Army and the commander of the IX Combined Air Corps. On the following day the army commander conducted a military game on a terrain model with the corps commanders and the commanders (chiefs) of the branches of troops. He then approved the cooperation planning table, copies of which were sent out to the formations. After this work started in the formations and units. The commanders and staffs of the divisions were allocated 2 days, those of the regiments and battalions were given 1 day, and the company commanders 2 days.[20]

The successive method ensured a more complete, thorough and detailed elaboration of all questions related to the planning and organizing of cooperation. The basic merit of the parallel method was the shortening of the times required to carry out the basic work, however often it led to a situation where in the inferior levels up to a certain time complete data were lacking needed for the final conclusion of the work. For this reason corrections had to be made in previously given instructions and plans. To a certain degree this complicated the work.

Thus, for planning and organizing cooperation in the preparing of front and army offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War, the greater concretization and the increase in depth to which troop operations were coordinated became characteristic trends. Cooperation was planned and organized in greatest detail for the period of breaking through the tactical zone of enemy defenses and particularly carefully between the troops operating in the sector of the main thrust. The commanders personally gave exceptionally great importance to working out the questions of cooperation on the terrain.

Under present-day conditions, the spatial scope of operations and the number of men and equipment involved in them have significantly increased and this has entailed a sharp increase in the scope of the questions and a greater role for cooperation. At

the same time the experience of the war has largely not lost its significance in our days and with a creative approach can be successfully applied and produce a good effect.

Combat experience has shown that as the scope of the questions has grown in coordinating efforts in an operation, the role of the commander has also increased in organizing cooperation. For this reason it would be completely logical to assume that in the future this trend will prevail and this will require from the commanders a constant improvement of skills in organizing and maintaining cooperation.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the remaining questions of cooperation, see: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 172-175; "Obshchevoyskovaya Armiya v Nastuplenii" [A Combined-Arms Army on the Offensive], Voyenizdat, 1966, pp 73-79; "Bitva na Kurskoy Duge" [Battle on the Kursk Salient], Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp 105-110; "Velikaya Pobeda Sovetskogo Naroda 1941-1945" [The Great Victory of the Soviet People in 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp 269-277; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1972, pp 16-26; No 3, 1973, pp 12-20; No 9 [1973], pp 89-96; No 10, 1978, pp 26-34 and so forth.

2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 315, inv. 4440, file 4, sheets 79-82.

3. Ibid., folio 317, inv. 4306, file 473, sheets 76-82.

4. Ibid., folio 345, inv. 5497, file 93, sheets 80-82.

5. Ibid., folio 302, inv. 4259, file 446, sheet 42.

6. Ibid., inv. 1496, file 23, sheets 207, 208, 210, 211.

7. Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2356, file 540, sheets 11, 12.

8. Ibid., folio 388, inv. 8712, file 1046, sheet 54.

9. Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2356, file 739, sheet 45.

10. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4148, file 326, sheets 1-49.

11. Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2356, file 430, sheets 64-71; file 425, sheets 57-70.

12. Division commander, Maj Gen P. N. Lashchenko.--Ed.

13. A. S. Zhadov, "Chetyre Goda Voyny" [Four Years of War], Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 105-106, 300-301.

14. K. K. Rokossovskiy, "Soldatskiy Dolg" [Soldier's Duty], Voyenizdat, 1972, p 152.

15. F. S. Moskalenko, "Na Yugo-Zapadnom Napravlenii" [In the Southwestern Sector], Book 2, Voyenizdat, 1979, p 144.

17. K. A. Meretskov, "Na Sluzhbe Narodu" [In the Service of the People], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, pp 318-323.

19. TsAMO, folio 422, inv. 10496, file 789, sheets 160-168; folio 237, inv. 2394, file 1339, sheets 1-22.

20. Ibid., folio 381, inv. 8378, file 383, sheets 2-3.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: DEFENSIVE COUNTERSTRIKES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 17-24

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Operational Art" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Maj Gen A. Maryshev and Lt Col V. Iminov: "From the Experience of Conducting Counterstrikes on the Defensive"; passages in italics printed in boldface in source]

[Text] One of the most important conditions for achieving success in the defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War was the activeness of the defending troops. Counterstrikes were considered to be the most vivid manifestation of this. They played an important role in successfully repelling and defeating the advancing enemy groupings and often led to the thwarting of its plans.

During the years of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces acquired the richest experience in preparing and conducting front and army counterstrikes under the most diverse conditions and for various objectives.[1] The article briefly analyzes certain particular features of their preparation and execution.

The defensive during the years of the Great Patriotic War occupied a significant place in the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces and during the first period of the war this was the basic type of combat operations. From the very first day the Soviet Army was forced to conduct the defensive with limited resources on a wide front. This occurred under very difficult conditions of the retreat under the pressure of a superior enemy, the absence of a series of previously prepared defensive lines as well as a lack of time to prepare for the operations. Here the counterstrikes had to be prepared, particularly during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, in the course of already developing defensive engagements. The counterstrikes were made in a situation of the extremely rapid development of events, when the enemy, having seized the initiative and air supremacy, advanced in powerful mobile groups, endeavoring to envelop the flanks and encircle the basic forces of our armies. The difficulties were further exacerbated by the absence of a sufficient amount of operational reserves and a lack of combat experience. In preparing the counterstrikes under these conditions, at first such major measures were carried out as the making of the plan for conducting it and issuing the missions to the troops, the creation of a counterstrike grouping and the organizing of its actions.

In making the plan, the commander of a front (army) first determined against which enemy grouping, with what objective and by what means the counterstrike was to be made, the men and equipment to be involved, their grouping and tasks as well as the cooperation and support procedures. For example, the commander of the Western Front, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko, in preparing a counterstrike in the Lepel' sector, decided on the morning of 6 July 1941 to rout the enemy XXXIX Motorized Corps advancing against Vitebsk by a strike by the V and VII Mechanized Corps of the 20th Army in cooperation with the aviation against the right flank of the enemy corps[2] for the purpose of gaining time to improve the defenses of the front's troops along the line of the Western Dvina and Dnepr rivers. Here, in the directive for its preparations, instructions were given for the location of the concentration areas of the mechanized corps, the directions of their strikes and the reinforcements.[3] In turn, the commander of the 20th Army, Lt Gen P. A. Kurochkin, proceeding from the instructions of Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko, established in his plan for each corps: the jump-off areas, the time for reaching them and the time for commencing the offensive, the demarcation lines, the immediate task, the direction of the further offensive and the task of the day, the composition of the supporting aviation and the cooperation procedures with it and the times for submitting reports.[4]

The most fully prepared measures were carried out with the early going over to the defensive and the presence of sufficient time. In this instance the implementing of the measures can be approximately divided into two interrelated stages: the preliminary and the immediate preparations for the counterstrike. In the first, the commander, in setting the plan for the defensive operation, depending upon the possible nature of enemy actions, decided in what sector (sectors) the counterstrike (counterstrikes) would be made, and tentatively defined the objective and the method of making the counterstrike, the composition of the counterstrike grouping and the tasks of the troops comprising it, the lines of deployment and the sequence of moving up to them as well as the procedures for artillery, air, engineer and logistic support of combat operations and the principles of cooperation and control. All these measures were reflected in the operation plan and on the basis of this the troops and the staffs prepared for the planned actions and the terrain was equipped. In the second stage (with the start of the defensive engagement), the commander, having assessed the situation which developed in the zone of the front (army), either made substantial changes in the initial plan or merely adjusted it. This was the case in the making of the counterstrike by the troops of the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk. In setting the plan for the defensive operation, the commander of the front, Arm Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, established that the Nazi offensive was possible along three axes. In accord with this, the staff elaborated three versions of counterstrikes by the army and front reserves and by the second echelons.[5] In the course of the defensive engagement, at 1200 hours on 5 July 1943, K. K. Rokossovskiy ordered a counterstrike to be made on the morning of the following day against the enemy which had broken through according to the basic (second) version with the aim of restoring the situation in the zone of the 13th Army. However, by evening it was apparent that the direction of the enemy's main thrust did not coincide with the assumed, and the commander at 2200 hours adjusted the tasks for the troops.[6]

Such "stage-by-stage" preparation of counterstrikes was chiefly determined by the fact that prior to the start of an engagement, it was virtually impossible to carry out all the preparatory measures fully due to the absence of complete clarity about the enemy's plans, the composition of its assault grouping and the presence of weak

points in it, the nature and pace of the development of events and so forth. Combat operations often developed in such a manner that the counterstrikes had to be made in sectors which were previously not envisaged by the plan, in a different grouping and with another objective.

One of the most important questions in the preparation of counterstrikes was the determining of their objectives. In the first counterstrikes of 1941, the commanders endeavored, as a rule, to rout the enemy groupings which had broken through and to recover the lost position.[7] However, such decisive objectives did not always correspond to the actually existing situation, to the balance of forces, to the state, position and combat capabilities of the involved troops, and for this reason the end result of a majority of the first counterstrikes was not the defeat of the enemy which had broken through but rather a temporary checking of its offensive in individual sectors (the counterstrikes of the XII and III Mechanized Corps in the region to the southwest of Shyaulyay, that of the horse-mechanized group of Lt Gen I. V. Boldin consisti of the VI and XI Mechanized Corps and the 36th Cavalry Division[8] in the Grodno sector and others). Certain of these distracted a portion of the Nazi forces from the main sectors and forced them to carry out a regrouping and to halt the offensive for a certain time. This made it possible for the Soviet command to gain time for organizing defenses along new lines. For example, for repelling the counterstrike of the VIII, IX, XV and XIX Mechanized Corps together with the rifle formations of the 5th and 6th armies of the Southwestern Front in the region of Lutsk, Dubno and Brody, the enemy was forced to bring up an additional seven fresh divisions. As a result its offensive in the sector of the main thrust was held up for an entire week.

As the front was stabilized and as the command personnel gained combat experience and greater skill, the role of counterstrikes in the defensive operations grew. In the first period of the war, some of them even began to achieve the objective of defeating the enemy which has broken through and restoring the lost position (the counterstrikes by the 33d Army of the Western Front to the north of Naro-Fominsk in December 1941, of the 9th Army of the Transcaucasian Front in November 1942 in the region of Ordzhonikidze and others).

The commanders and staffs, in setting the objectives of the counterstrikes, began to assess the specific conditions, the operational position and the capabilities of the sides more flexibly and thoroughly. Thus, the objectives became more diverse and realistic. In a series of defensive operations, the counterstrikes were made to improve the operational position of the troops by recovering important lines or objectives which had previously been captured by the enemy, as was done by the 24th Army of the Reserve Front at Yel'nya and the Maritime Army in defending Odessa in September 1941, the 16th Army of the Western Front in the region of Skirmanovo on 11-14 November 1941 and so forth. Sometimes they thwarted the enemy's attempts to surround the defending troops. For example, the 50th Army, having made a counterstrike in December 1941, not only avoided encirclement but also eliminated the threat of the capture of Tula.

Beginning in the autumn of 1942, counterstrikes began to play a crucial role in defeating the enemy which had broken into the operational depth and in thwarting its offensive plans. This was aided by the acquired experience, by the changed conditions of armed combat, by the increased combat might, strike power and mobility of

the operational field forces. The defensive operations were conducted under conditions when the strategic initiative was already on the side of the Soviet troops; the going over to the defensive was mainly caused by the need to hold lines achieved in the course of the offensive and for repelling an enemy counteroffensive and counterstrikes and in many instances was carried out intentionally. Defenses were deeply echeloned, with strong second echelons and reserves consisting basically of tank (mechanized) corps and tank armies. This helped to create powerful and maneuverable counterstrike groupings.

As for counterstrikes in the defensive operations of the final period of the war, in a majority of instances they achieved the set objectives. An exception would be the counterstrike carried out by the 4th Guards Army of Arm Gen G. F. Zakharov in the area of Zamol' in the Budapest sector on 9 January 1945 with the objective of crushing a Nazi assault grouping. For carrying this out, formations and units[9] were involved which had been weakened in previous defensive battles and did not possess sufficient strike force; moreover in terms of combat strength they were inferior to the enemy. As a result, the assault grouping was not defeated but the enemy suffered significant losses and halted the offensive.[10]

The result of the counterstrike depended largely upon the composition of the counterstrike grouping, its operational position and readiness for combat operations. At the start of the war, the mechanized corps were basically used, as a rule, from the reserve of the commanders of the fronts and armies. Some of them were a rather impressive force.[11] However, the great dispersity of the formations of the mechanized corps required significant and complicated regroupings. Under continuous exposure to enemy aviation, they carried out forced marches of great length, suffering significant casualties, and because of this reached the designated areas and deployment lines very late and were forced to enter the engagement without a halt and unit by unit, in individual divisions or even regiments, without sufficient artillery and air support and antiaircraft cover, with poor logistic support and often without time for reconnaissance and organizing cooperation. All of this naturally had a negative effect on the results of the counterstrikes and served as one of the significant reasons of their low effectiveness.

After the breaking up of the mechanized corps on the basis of the Directive of Headquarters of 15 July 1941, the counterstrike groupings began to be created from separate reinforced rifle and cavalry formations. In an army for this they could use from 1-1.5 to 2-3 and more rarely 4 reinforced divisions, and in a front from 5-6 divisions up to a combined-arms army. For example, in the counterstrike of the 1st Assault Army (commander, Lt Gen V. I. Kuznetsov) to the north of Moscow at the end of November 1941, involved were one tank division without tanks as well as two rifle brigades and one tank brigade; the counterstrike of the Western Front in the region of Kashira on 27 November 1941 was made by the forces of one cavalry corps reinforced with a rifle and tank divisions, a tank brigade and two separate tank battalions.

It must be pointed out that in a number of instances due to the hurry in organizing combat operations, even such small groupings as before were committed to the battle at different times and unit by unit. This was the case, for example, in the counterstrike made by the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front at Kiev. On 16 July 1941, an attack against the enemy was made by the V Cavalry Corps, a rifle regiment and

tank battalion, on 18 July by two rifle divisions and on the 23d by another two. Such employment of the troops led to unjustified losses and rarely achieved the objective.

The attempts to reinforce the counterstrike groupings from the first echelon formations and also from the troops of the secondary sectors during the first period of the war rarely succeeded. In the first echelon, they were, as a rule, tied down by battles. The fear of stripping unattacked defensive areas as well as the low maneuverability of the rifle formations often did not allow their prompt concentration in the jump-off areas from other sectors.

By the end of 1941, in conducting defenses in the armies, stronger reserves began to be created and sometimes second echelons consisting of one or two divisions. Thus, in the defensive operation on the distant approaches to Moscow, the 19th and 20th armies of the Western Front in October 1941 had second echelons consisting of two rifle divisions in each army, while the 5th and 16th armies in the defensive operation on the near approaches to the capital in November 1941 had reserves of a rifle division, four tank brigades and a rifle and cavalry division and three tank brigades, respectively.[12]

In 1942, they began to assign tank and mechanized corps and tank armies of mixed composition to the reserve of certain fronts. The presence of mobile troops made it possible for the commanders to create the required groupings more decisively and in a shorter time and to make strong counterstrikes on the threatened sector while the increased maneuverability of the troops as a whole provided an opportunity to take men and equipment from unattacked sectors to carry them out. The effectiveness of the counterstrikes was significantly increased, however it could have been even higher if in making them, particularly at first, serious shortcomings had not been present. One of the most indicative examples in this regard was the counterstrike made by the troops of the Stalingrad Front at the end of July 1942 in the area of Verkhne-Buzinovka. Used in it against five enemy divisions were the 1st and 4th Tank armies, a portion of the forces from the 21st, 62d and 64th armies and the aviation of the 8th Air Army numbering 5 rifle divisions, over 550 tanks and 155 airplanes.[13] This, seemingly, would have ensured the defeat of the enemy. However, due to the poor organization of control, cooperation and support, only the tank corps, one rifle division of the 1st Tank Army and one rifle division of the 62d Army could commence combat operations at the designated time. The 4th Tank Army held up in crossing the Don River because of the lack of crossing equipment,[14] made an attack only with a portion of the forces and only after 2 days.

The experience of this and other counterstrikes (the counterstrike by the 5th Tank Army of the Bryansk Front at Voronezh in July 1942) shows that there still was not sufficient overall superiority in men and equipment to achieve success. Success was achieved by a decisive concentration of the basic forces on the main sector with the aim of achieving a tangible superiority over the enemy, by the precise assigning of tasks and the granting of the necessary time to the troops for preparations, by dependable organization of cooperation and control as well as by the all-round support for combat operations. Precisely this was how the counterstrike was organized by the 64th Army of the Southwestern Front in August 1942 in the region of Abganerovo, this counterstrike ended with the defeat of the enemy which had broken through and by the restoring of the lost position. During its preparations the troops of the

army in an organized manner took up the jump-off position while the commanders and staffs carefully planned a 30-minute artillery softening up and coordinated the procedure for carrying out the mission. In the sector of the main thrust in an area around 9 km wide superiority over the enemy was created as follows: by 3-fold in personnel, by 2-fold in artillery and an equal ratio of forces for tanks.[15]

The acquired experience in organizing counterstrike groupings was reinforced in the draft of the 1943 Field Manual, Article 528 of which stated: "As the most dangerous sector for the enemy breakthrough of our defenses is established, the commander of an army (corps) organizes a counterattack by his second echelon, in reinforcing it when necessary by troops from the less threatened sectors. The counterattack is supported by aviation and tanks and is conducted by the second echelon independently or in cooperation with the reserves of the divisions (brigades) of the main sector."[16]

In the subsequent years of the war, the problem of creating counterstrike groupings was successfully solved. Rigid centralization was established in the use of the army and front reserves and the second echelons which were now based on tank and mechanized corps and tank armies of uniform composition. As a rule, front counterstrikes involved one or two armies, including a tank army, one or two corps, several separate rifle (cavelry) divisions, frontal [tactical] aviation, and artillery of the troops and the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve]. The army counterstrike groupings usually consisted of one or two corps and several rifle divisions.

A major role in the successful conducting of counterstrikes was played by the choice of the sector and the timing of them. In a majority of the defensive operations, they were made against the flanks or one of the flanks of the advancing enemy. Such a method of operation created the most favorable conditions for encircling and subsequently defeating the grouping which had broken through. As an example one might use the counterstrike by the 11th Army of the Northwestern Front at Sol'tsy in July 1941. The army commander, Lt Gen V. I. Morozov, created two groupings (northern and southern) which attacked along converging axes in the flanks of the Nazi troops which had broken through the defenses, with the subsequent coming out in the rear of the Nazi troops. As a result the enemy 8th Tank Army, a portion of the forces of the 3d Motorized Division and the rear units of the LVI Motorized Corps were encircled and defeated.[17]

Often during the war years, the situation required the planning and making of frontal counterstrikes. Such a method was characteristic for conditions when the enemy assault grouping was sufficiently strong and there was no time for a regrouping and the executing of an involved maneuver. In these conditions, the counterstrike was made along the shortest and not along the most advantageous axis from the operational viewpoint. As a rule, in such counterstrikes the basic enemy forces were tied down, it was caused significant losses and thereby a threat was eliminated of breaking through the entire defensive depth, while our troops possessed the initiative (the counterstrikes by the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Battle of Kursk in July 1943).

The counterstrikes were planned and conducted during the various stages of the breaking through of the defenses by the enemy. For example, the first echelon armies of the fronts made counterstrikes, as a rule, in the fight for the main defensive zone and more rarely for the second one, ordinarily during the second day of a defensive

engagement or somewhat later. A majority of them started in the morning, however there were instances when they were carried out during the second half of the day as well as during darkness (the II Guards Tank Corps in the area of the 6th Guards Army of the Vorohezh Front in the Battle of Kursk).

The front counterstrikes were made with the breaking through of the enemy into the operational zone of defenses and most often when a threat arose of breaking through the second area. Their preparations started, as a rule, even during the period of the fight of the first echelon armies to retain the main zone. This made it possible for the commander to clarify the enemy's plans and considering the specific conditions carry out the required regrouping.

The experience of the war showed that the counterstrikes could be most advantageously carried out when the enemy which had broken through, in suffering losses in the fight against the first echelon of the defending troops, had halted and its immediate reserves had been used up while the deep reserves had not yet reached the area of the engagement.

Of great significance for the success of the counterstrikes were the concealment of their preparations as well as well organized cooperation and control of the troops. Thus, the counterstrike conducted on 20 August 1942 by a portion of the forces from the 63d Army of the Stalingrad Front (army commander, Lt Gen V. I. Kuznetsov) on the general axis of Perelazovskiy, was a surprise for the Nazis, because the creation of the grouping and its concentration in the jump-off areas, the deployment of the artillery, the preparations to cross the Don and other measures were carried out only at night. All conversations, including telephone calls, involving the pending combat operations were prohibited, and the counterstrike itself commenced without artillery softening up. As a result the enemy was able to put up organized resistance only after our troops had driven 200-400 m into its positions.

Cooperation for the period of the counterstrike was organized according to the same principles as on an offensive. Basic attention was given to coordinating artillery fire and air strikes with the actions of the troops in the counterstrike groupings. During the first period of the war, particularly in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, due to the lack of time and combat experience, cooperation was organized, as a rule, from the map and in a most general form. Subsequently it was initially planned from the map in setting the missions and then adjusted on the terrain and if there was enough time was worked through in detail in special exercises. In them the commander of the front (army) saw to it, as was the case in organizing the defensive operation at Kursk, that each army (formation) commander firmly knew: what he was to do and when, what forces were to be involved in the event the enemy broke through in one or another sector, how and with which units the counterstrike would be supported in artillery, air and engineer terms, how cooperation would be organized with them and so forth. All these questions were reflected in detail in the diagram plan of the counterstrikes by the army and front reserves of the Central Front and in the legend for it.[18]

The actions of the counterstrike grouping were directed, as a rule, by the commander from the command post set up in the sector of its advance. Often for this an operations group was created headed by the deputy commander of the front (army) or leadership was entrusted to one of the armies (corps). For example, in the counterstrike

on the Yel'nya sector at the beginning of August 1941 the commander of the 24th Army, Maj Gen K. I. Rakutin, led the operations group consisting of the 100th, 103d, 107th, 19th and 120th Rifle divisions, the 106th Mechanized Division and the 105th and 102d Tank divisions.[19]

The experience gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War shows that counterstrikes are the highest manifestation of activity on the defensive. Their success depends upon the correct choice of the moment and method of making them, the precise coordination of efforts by the assigned resources, all-round support and surprise of the actions.

The basic trend in creating the counterstrike groupings was a constant rise in their quantitative and qualitative composition by bringing in, in addition to the second echelons and reserves, reinforcements, formations and units of the first echelon and men and equipment from the unattacked sectors, as well as saturating the second echelons and reserves with armored and mechanized troops. In the use of the counterstrike groupings there was a constantly growing move toward their maximum massing on the main sector and the making of a powerful initial attack with its subsequent development in depth. This tendency was reflected primarily in the narrowing of the zones and in the increase in the density of men and equipment and the depth of the operational configuration of the counterstrike groupings.

The appearance of nuclear missile weapons in the postwar period, the further development and improvement of conventional weapons and the saturating of the troops with them have not reduced the importance of the combat experience gained in the war. Undoubtedly, modern defensive operations will be characterized by greater dynamism and activeness of the combat operations. In our opinion, this will force the commanders and staffs to prepare and make counterstrikes without a pause, at a high pace, by surprise and at any time of the day against enemy groupings which have broken through. Their preparation can be carried out in even more limited time.

FOOTNOTES

1. Information can be found in the following publications on the counterstrikes made during the years of the Great Patriotic War: "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny" [History of World War II], Vols 4-8, Voyenizdat, 1975-1977; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1977, p 329; "Voyennoye Iskusstvo vo Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Izd. VAGSh, 1973, pp 63, 365-367; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne, 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Vols 1-4, Voyenizdat, 1958-1959; "Nachal'nyy Period Voyny" [The Initial Period of a War], Voyenizdat, 1963, pp 645-646; "Armeyskiye Operatsii" [Army Operations], Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 197-204; "Istoriya Voyn i Voyennogo Iskusstva" [The History of Wars and Military Art], Voyenizdat, 1970; "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vols 2-6, Voyenizdat, 1960-1965; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1962, pp 39-42; No 3, 1964, pp 32-44; No 6, 1971, pp 19-21 and so forth.

2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 5 mk, inv. 382838, file 1, sheet 76.

3. Ibid., folio 208, inv. 10169, file 44, sheets 128, 129.

4. Ibid., inv. 3038, file 33, sheets 4-5, 16.

5. Ibid., folio 226, inv. 321, file 21, sheets 15-20.

6. Ibid., folio 233, inv. 20900, file 2, sheet 27.

7. Counterstrikes by the mechanized corps of the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts together with the rifle formations of the cover armies and so forth.

8. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 4857, file 11, sheets 48, 49.

9. One regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division, the 63d Guards Cavalry Division, the 5th Guards Airborne Division, two brigades of the VII Mechanized Corps and two brigades of the I Guards Mechanized Corps.

10. "Sbornik Voyenno-Istoricheskikh Materialov Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" [Collection of Military History Materials from the Great Patriotic War], No 5, Voyenizdat, 1951, p 119.

11. For example, the VIII Mechanized Corps by the beginning of combat operations had 932 tanks, although just 169 of them were modern heavy and medium KV and T-34 tanks, and of the remaining 763 combat vehicles, 197 required factory overhaul (TsAMO, folio 131, inv. 8664, file 5, sheet 38).

12. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1971, p 17.

13. TsAMO, folio 206, inv. 229, file 24, sheets 22, 23; folio 206, inv. 220, file 71, sheets 7, 8; folio 346, inv. 5755, file 4, sheet 21.

14. In its XXII Mechanized Corps (the first echelon), only 17 tanks were able to cross to the right bank of the Don by the designated time (TsAMO, folio 206, inv. 220, file 85, sheet 31).

15. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1962, p 43.

16. "Polevoy Ustav Krasnoy Armii (Proyekt)" [Red Army Field Manual (Draft)], Voyenizdat, 1943, p 258.

17. "Armeyskiye Operatsii," Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 200-201.

18. TsAMO, folio 226, inv. 321, file 23.

19. Ibid., folio 219, inv. 36549, file 3, sheets 224-226.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: EMPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 25-29

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Operational Art" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank (Res) V. Dmitriyev: "Improving the Combat Employment of Submarines Based on the Experience of 1943-1945 Operations"*; passages in italics printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The main task of the submarines in the Soviet Navy during the second and third periods of the war, as in 1941-1942, was to disrupt the enemy sea lines of communications.

In June 1944, a brigade of submarines (BPL) from the Black Sea Fleet was reorganized into two brigades and a separate training division. The first and second BPL were rebased from the ports on the Black Sea Coast of the Caucasus to the ports of the Crimean Peninsula. The cardinal changes in the military-political situation in the Baltic in 1944 (Finland's pull-out from the war in September) made it possible in the autumn to rebase the BPL of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the Finnish ports of Helsinki, Turku (Abo) and Hanko. The new base points provided an opportunity to shorten the time required to move into battle stations and in the Baltic Fleet, in addition, to use the subs in winter.

The enemy antisubmarine forces in all the theaters of war increased. Special hunter-strike groups (PUG) began to be organized, submarines were used in carrying out ASW missions and in the Black Sea decoy vessels appeared. The minefields were replaced and strengthened using anchored antisubmarine mines. Shore radar and sonar and other observation equipment began to be more widely used. This forced our submarines to operate predominantly in a submerged position.

In the Baltic theater of war, the enemy, in suffering very tangible casualties in 1942 in its transport fleet from the submarines of the KBF [Red Banner Baltic Fleet], in 1943 closed off the Gulf of Finland in the area of the Nargen-Porkkalaudd station with a submarine net, it set out new lines of mines, it equipped the submarine

---

*For the article "The Combat Employment of Submarines in 1941-1942," see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1980, pp 26-33.

barrier with sonar equipment and increased the number of ASW ships and airplanes. In 1944, the Nazis strengthened this antisubmarine net defense.

The increased antisubmarine defenses of the enemy impeded the operations of our subs and demanded from the commanders and the entire crew high art and combat skill to cross it.

In 1943-1945, *the search was continued for new forms and methods for the combat employment of submarines.* In operations on the lines of communications there was a combination of the station and maneuvering methods of using the subs. The maneuvering method made it possible to increase the effectiveness of the combat employment of the subs, it opened up an opportunity to broaden the initiative of their commanders but also depended largely upon the good organization of reconnaissance in the interests of the submarines. It included cruising by individual subs in a limited or comparatively extensive area, the servicing of the stations by several submarines, the group use of them in previously designated areas and so forth. For example, the Black Sea Fleet submarines in traveling to the stations or upon return to base, in a number of instances, operated off the southern coasts of the Crimea in cruising in a broad area. They were given the right to actively hunt for the enemy and to attack. The same method was used by the Northern Fleet submarines. Moreover, in the Northern Fleet, under the conditions of the polar day, they also used the method of serving one area by two or three submarines which relieved each other according to a special schedule. Here, one submarine was continuously operating on the enemy lines of communications, the second was in the battery charging area and the third was moving after charging to relieve the first. As a result the average monthly losses of enemy transport tonnage in 1943 for each operating submarine were the highest.[1]

The deployment of the KBF submarines which were to be used sequentially in three echelons started during the night of 7 May 1943. As in the operations of 1942, they had to cross the antisubmarine barrier in the Gulf of Finland independently. However they did not succeed in crossing it, particularly the net defense.

In February 1943, in the Northern Fleet they conducted the first attempt to use a tactical group of two cruising submarines which maintained contact in a submerged position with the aid of a Dragon-129 sonar. The distance between the subs in their maneuvering underwater varied within the limits of 20-25 cable lengths (3.7-4.6 km). In the course of a joint hunt, K-3 [a sub] (commander, Capt 3d Rank K. I. Malafeyev) sunk the German submarine chaser UJ-1108 ("Elba") on 5 February. Initially the subs maintained constant underwater communication, but on 7 February the sonar failed on K-3.[2] The attempt at the group use of submarines during this period was unsuccessful due to the technical unreliability of the available sonar equipment.

The total tonnage of the vessels destroyed by the submarines of the Black Sea and Northern fleets in 1943 was around 40 percent of the total combat losses in enemy tonnage in the Black Sea and Northern theaters of war.[3]

In the course of the Crimean Operation of 1943, the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet successfully employed the method of maneuvering previously designated stations. During the period of preparing for the operation, a regulation was worked out on the cooperation of the subs with the reconnaissance aviation using TUS [Table of Conventional Signals], and instructions on the communications of the subs with the staffs

of the BPL and the reconnaissance air regiment and between these staffs.[4] In the northwestern part of the sea for the subs they marked off 16 stations, 10 of which were located in the areas of the basic enemy lines of communications linking its isolated Crimean grouping with Romanian ports. Within the stations the submarines (an average of six and sometimes nine) independently hunted for convoys. According to the data of air reconnaissance, they moved to positions with more intense ship traffic. In addition mutual alerting of the submarines was employed. This made it possible 19 times to guide them to the courses of the convoys. As a result the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet which participated in the operations carried out 26 torpedo attacks, having destroyed 8 enemy ships and 5 war ships and having damaged 2 transports and 1 war ship.[5]

In the operation of the Northern Fleet on the enemy sea lines of communications ("RV-1") conducted from 16 January through 4 February 1944, for the first time the method was used which became known as a "hanging screen." Its essence was the following. A group of four or five subs was deployed ahead of time in waiting areas 26-30 miles (48-56 km) off the coast (outside the zone of active ASW operations), in "hanging" to the north above the coastal enemy communications. In remaining submerged, the submarines at the designated hour rose to periscope depth for picking up the reconnaissance data using the VAN-PZ [abbreviation unknown] and which were broadcast by the Northern Fleet aviation or radio. The sub commanders calculated the courses for intercepting the convoy, the shortest route and at the highest speed went into the attack and then returned to the waiting area. When air reconnaissance was not carried out because of bad meteorological conditions, the submarines hunted the convoys independently. The "hanging screen" method made it possible to sequentially make strikes against the enemy convoys using several subs, freeing them from the necessity of repeatedly crossing the enemy minefields. In addition, the probability was reduced of the premature protection and pursuit of the submarines by the ASW forces.

In the operation "RV-3" of 16-31 May 1944, the submarines S-103, S-56, S-15 and M-201 deployed in a "hanging screen" successfully cooperated with the aircraft of the 118th Air Reconnaissance Regiment.[6] On 25 May, the submarine radio operators received a radiogram from a scout aircraft about the location and composition of an enemy convoy. The first to intercept it was M-201 (commander, Capt-Lt N. I. Balin). Two torpedoes, one of which had a proximity fuse, sank the submarine chaser UJ-1764. After the attack, the submarine was pursued. The submariners counted 270 explosions of depth charges and diving shells. Some 40 minutes later, the convoy was attacked by S-15 (commander, Capt-Lt G. K. Vasil'yev), having destroyed the transport "Solviken" (3,502 gross registered tons). The next joint operation of the submarines S-14, S-104, M-200, M-201 and L-20 and aviation was conducted from 10 through 25 June. Following the guidance of the reconnaissance aircraft, the submarines on 20 June in sequence attacked the enemy convoy AS-7492. Particularly successful were the operations of S-104 (commander, Capt 3d Rank V. A. Turayev) which with one torpedo salvo destroyed an enemy transport, the submarine chaser UJ-1209 and a minesweeper.[7] This same method was used by the Northern Fleet submarines during the period of preparing and carrying out the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, having made 16 sorties from 16 September through 31 October 1944, and sinking 6 transports and a minesweeper and having damaged a destroyer and a transport.[8]

In those instances when air reconnaissance detected an enemy convoy, correctly established its elements of movement and promptly transmitted these data to the

submarines, the effectiveness of their combat employment rose significantly. During 1944, more than 40 percent of the attacks were carried out by the submarines using the "hanging screen" method. In using the data from the reconnaissance aircraft, they sank 22 transports (60,610 gross registered tons) and 15 war ships, and caused damage to 3 transports, a destroyer and an escort vessel.[9]

In the Baltic theater of war, by 10 October 10 submarines were operating in the sea, and 5 of them were in the area of Libava and Vindava in narrow sectors, that is, they were being used by the station method. They were given the task of blockading the ports through which the enemy troop grouping sealed off by the Soviet Army on the Courland Peninsula was being supplied.

In 1945, in the period of the East Prussian (13 January-25 April) and Eastern Pomeranian (10 February-4 April) operations, the KBF submarines disrupted enemy lines of communications in the southern and southwestern parts of the Baltic, together with the air force they sealed off Libava, they attacked enemy war ships in the area of the maritime flanks of our troops and conducted operational reconnaissance on the approaches to the German bases and ports. On the enemy lines of communications, the submarines operated by the maneuvering method which was the most effective.

In 1944, the KBF submarines sank 33 vessels and tugs and 2 war ships without suffering any losses. Over the 4 months of 1945, the KBF submarines destroyed 29 vessels and 7 warships, having lost only 1 submarine.[10] During the third period of the war, the KBF submarines achieved an effectiveness which had not been attained by any navy of the world: for our 1 lost submarine there were 63 transport and auxiliary vessels and 9 war ships lost by the enemy.

The combat *control of submarine operations* in the second period of the war in the KBF as before remained in the hands of the fleet command and staff, while in the Black Sea and Northern fleets it was transferred to the command and the staffs of the OPL. Control of the submarines which were employed in daily combat activities was carried out by radio through the base radio centers. Here extensive use was made of the TUS. In conducting operations on the enemy sea lines of communications command was transferred to the command of the fleets.

In the Crimean Operation (8 April-12 May 1944) in which the submarines, aviation and torpedo boats carried out the task of disrupting the enemy lines of communications, combat control over them was carried out by the Black Sea Fleet commander. The centralization of leadership in the operation, when cooperation between the submarines and the other naval forces had to be organized particularly clearly, proved fully effective.

In the Northern Fleet in conducting operations on the enemy sea lines of communications the control of the diverse forces (including the submarines) was also in the hands of the fleet commander. In January-August 1944, the submarines participated in six such operations under the code name of "RV," cooperating not only operationally but also tactically with the other naval forces. Up to 50 percent of the torpedo attacks were carried out using the air reconnaissance data.

The control of the KBF submarines operating in accord with the "submarine warfare manual" approved by the military council of the fleet on 3 April 1944 was carried out

from the flagship command post (FKP) of the BPL which was located on the submarine tender "Irtysh" in Helsinki. However the FKP of the BPL did not have direct communications with the submarines at sea as the radiograms were transmitted via the Kronshtadt radio. The movement of the submarines was carried out only upon the orders of the KBF command or with his approval. In 1945, an auxiliary command post of the BPL staff was organized in Palanga (under the air force staff) and this helped to improve cooperation with the aviation.[11]

As a result of the combat experience acquired by the BPL commanders and staffs, control of the submarines improved in comparison with the first period of the war.

Improving cooperation between the submarines and aviation was given the most serious attention. For example, in 1943, the staff of the Northern Fleet each day provided them with data obtained by reconnaissance aviation on the situation in the theater of war. In the Black Sea theater of war, operational cooperation was organized between the BPL and Air Force staffs. In April, a hunt for the enemy was organized by a group consisting of Shch-209, S-33 and M-35 which at the designated hours received radioed information from the reconnaissance aviation.[12] The S-33 (commander, Capt 3d Rank B. A. Alekseyev), in conducting an independent hunt, was successful, having sunk on 20 April the largest troop transport "Sucheava" in the Black Sea (6,876 gross registered tons). Also using air reconnaissance data transmitted via the staff of the BPL, the Shch-201 (commander, Capt-Lt P. I. Paramoshkin) during the night of 7 July damaged an enemy transport which was subsequently sunk by the Black Sea Fleet aviation.

Along with operations on the sea lines of communications, the subs continued to conduct reconnaissance and to land sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The Northern Fleet submarines were involved in defending the external and internal sea lines of communications. In 1943, the Northern Fleet BPL was given the mission of combating enemy submarines. On 28 August, S-101 which was on station at Cape Zhelaniya (the northern extremity of Novaya Zemlya), sunk the German submarine, U-639 which was returning from laying mines on our sea communications in the Kara Sea.

An important role in the achieving of the combat successes by the submarines was played by *party-political work* aimed at further improving the military skills of the personnel. The commanders, the political bodies and the party and Komsomol organizations actively propagandized advanced combat experience and worked to raise the efficient employment of the submarine weapons. The political-moral state of the personnel on the Soviet submarines was exceptionally high. The party group in them had grown significantly. While by the start of the war communists represented 26.8 percent of the number of the submarine crews, by May 1945, 56 percent of the submariners had become party members and candidate members.[13]

The combat achievements of the submariners were highly regarded by the motherland. In the second period of the war, the Northern Fleet BPL and two submarines (of the Northern Fleet) were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, while the crews of eight subs (three from the KBF, two from the Black Sea Fleet and three from the Northern Fleet) were given the title of guards. In the third period of the war, another 16 subs became Red Banner (five from the KBF, six from the Black Sea Fleet and five from the Northern Fleet), and four submarine crews became guards (three from the Black Sea Fleet and one from the Northern Fleet). Thirteen submariners were awarded

the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Order of the Red Banner was presented to the KBF BPL and the first BPL of the Black Sea Fleet which also received the honorary name of Sevastopol'; the Red Banner BPL of the Northern Fleet and the second BPL of the Black Sea Fleet received the Order of Ushakov, First Degree.

The combat experience of the Great Patriotic War is being carefully studied and creatively applied by Soviet submariners at present.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva" [History of Naval Art], Voyenizdat, 1969, p 423.

2. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 200, file 24720, sheets 30 verso-31.

3. "Protiv Fal'sifikatorov Istorii Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny" [Against the Falsifiers of the History of World War II], Voyenizdat, 1959, pp 236, 249; "Porazheniye Germanskogo Imperializma vo Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyne" [The Defeat of German Imperialism in World War II], Voyenizdat, 1960, pp 123, 130.

4. TsVMA, folio 112, file 13255, sheet 5.

5. G. I. Vaneyev, "Chernomortsy v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne" [The Black Sea Sailors in the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 339, 341.

6. TsVMA, folio 411, file 35629, sheet 29 verso.

7. Ibid., folio 411, inv. 1, file 35629, sheets 59, 65 verso, 84, 84 verso.

8. "Morskoy Atlas" [Naval Atlas], Vol 3, Military History. Part 2. Descriptions for maps. Moscow, 1966, p 494.

9. "Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva," pp 426, 427-428.

10. "Dvazhdy Krasnoznamenny Baltiyskiy Flot" [The Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet], Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 273, 285.

11. V. I. Achkasov, N. B. Pavlovich, "Sovetskoye Voyenno-Morskoye Iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne" [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1973, p 278.

12. TsVMA, folio 32, file 6240, sheet 112.

13. Ibid., folio 243, file 23919, sheet 11.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: TANK ARMY REAR SERVICES SUPPORT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 30-36

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Operational Art" by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences, Col I. Karpushin: "Rear Services Support for the First Guards Tank Army in the L'vow-Sandomierz Operation"]

[Text] By the start of the operation[1] the rear services of the army (chief of the rear services, Maj Gen V. F. Kon'kov and chief of staff of rear services Col M. P. Klepikov) included the field army base No 99 (33 dumps), a hospital base (15 hospitals), a motor transport regiment, a separate motor transport battalion for the delivery of fuels and lubricants, two repair and rebuilding battalions and other units.[2]

The field army base (PAB) was located at the railroad station of Olyka, 20-25 km from the forward edge, while the army dumps of the 13th Army were 35-40 km from the forward edge. The station of Dembowe Korczma located 3-5 km from the forward edge had been designated as the unloading station.

The bringing of the supply reserves as close as possible to the forward edge in the first Guards Tank Army was dictated by the experience of the previous operations and by the planning of a higher momentum of advance in comparison with the combined-arms armies. A detachment of an engineer supply dump was brought closer to the troops because of the need to support the crossing of large water barriers.[3]

Immediate preparations for the operation commenced on 7 July 1944 with the receiving by the army of a copy of the operational directive from the commander of the front's troops.[4] The chief of the army's rear services and his staff began to plan rear support immediately after receiving the instructions from the army commander. First of all it was necessary to think out in detail and plan the supply of the army with everything needed and organize the control of the rear units in the course of the operation, to work out and coordinate a portion of the questions of cooperation with the sections and services not under the deputy army commander for the rear services as well as the questions which could arise in the course of combat operations. Thus, in the event of a breakdown in the delivery of supplies by motor transport, they were to be brought up by air. This freight as to be delivered to the detachments of the army dumps on the ground, that is, th supply reserves were to be brought as close as possible to the troops.

As a result of the work done, the staff of the army's rear services worked out and issued to the troops a rear services order.[5] Prior to the issuing of this, the procedure for distributing materiel was determined by the particular instructions of the deputy army commander for rear services.

As a consequence of the short distance of the PAB behind the forward edge, the supply reserves were issued prior to the start of the offensive from the basic dumps and not from their detachments located in the field, and with the start of the operation in accord with the plan for the rear support of the troops, from the dumps and dump detachments located in the area of the unloading station. Only on the third day of the operation were the detachments of the army dumps in the field to begin work. This was the first time the army had used such a method of delivering materiel which had been suggested by all previous experience. It made it possible to keep significant supplies of ammunition and fuel in the troops and then use them at the most crucial moments of combat deep in the defenses, for example, in crossing the Western Bug River. The new procedure for operating the PAB demonstrated its effectiveness in subsequent operations.

By the start of the operation, the army possessed only two surgical hospitals (instead of three according to the TOE), and for this reason the rear support plan envisaged that each surgical field mobile hospital (khppg) would operate with one detachment of the 46th Head Detachment of the Field Evacuation Point (gopep). The detachments of the gopep were given the task of receiving the wounded who had been treated at the khppg and evacuating them beyond the army, to the hospitals of the third Guards and 13th armies as well as to the front head medical collection points. The army hospitals were freed of the existing sick and wounded, they were brought up closer to the troops and held ready for deployment.

The established supply reserves, due to their prompt delivery by rail from the front dumps, by the start of the operation were basically created. There were up to 6.5 units of fire for ammunition, 3.5 fuelings of diesel fuel, 4.4 fuelings of gasoline, and 24 day's rations of food.[6] Only the supplies of fuel and lubricant at the army dumps had not been brought up to the standard. The lacking fuel (1.5 fuelings of diesel fuel) was delivered by the front by rail during the first days of the operation. Characteristically the troop supplies were the first to be brought up to the standard in stockpiling the materiel. This ensured the prompt going over of the troops to the offensive and made it possible for them to independently replenish the consumption of materiel for 5-6 days for ammunition, 7 days for fuel and up to 10 days for food.

For more flexible control of the troop units, an operations group of the rear services headquarters was organized headed by the chief of the army rear services. It included representatives from the sections and services of the army rear services and they had at their disposal a mobile fuel reserve (around 0.1 fuelings for gasoline and around 0.05 fuelings for diesel fuel), the 11th Army Company for the collection of captured material and scrap metal (arst), as well as a head road detachment created from the resources of the 146th omsb [separate bridge construction battalion] and the 2d odeb [separate road maintenance battalion] (one bridge building and one provost traffic control company). The operations group was located at the army command post.

Along with the rear services headquarters (it was headed by the chief of staff of the army rear services) in Olyka (see the diagram) there was the 853d khppg and the 1158th tppg [mobile therapeutic field hospital], the 146th omsb and the 2d odeb, the 35th oatp [separate motor transport battalion] and the 282d oatb with the supplies of fuels, lubricants, ammunition and food, as well as the 83d apvp and a detachment of the 24th pakh [mobile field bakery].[7] With the start of combat operations the rear headquarters moved into the area of the unloading station.

The organization of deliveries was significantly complicated by the poor availability of motor transport for the formations and units as well as due to the rigid fuel consumption standards. The shortage of motor transport was felt particularly acutely in the mechanized brigades and motorized rifle subunits. Thus, by the start of combat operations in the VIII Guards Motorized Corps motor transport did not exceed 50 percent of the scheduled. As a whole the army was supplied only by 61 percent in terms of motor transport.[8] Under such conditions only careful training of each driver and proper working order of each vehicle could ensure the prompt execution of the set tasks.

On the morning of 13 July, the forward battalions of the 3d Guards and 13th armies went over to the offensive on the Rawa-Ruska sector. By the end of 15 July, the troops had advanced up to 20 km in depth and had completed the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defensive zone. Upon a decision of the commander of the front, on 13 July the 1st Guards Tank Army was thrown into the breach for developing the success of the 13th Army on the axis of Sokal, Rawa-Ruska. The army rear services began to move forward along with the combat units. The operations group of the rear services headquarters moved together with the army command post. Its head road detachment moved steadily along behind the troops, restoring the destroyed sections of road and bridges to a passable state.

The rear headquarters moved from the area of Ostrow to the area of Stroyanov, where the detachments of the army field dumps were located. The 583d khppg, the first squad of the 46th gopep, a portion of the forces of the 35th oatp, the 146th omsb and the odeb also arrived here.[9] The distance of the army dump detachments behind the troops was 8-10 km, and they were 20-25 km away from the unloading station. This provided the prompt delivery of materiel.

The advance of the 1st Guards Tank Army developed successfully. At dawn of 18 July, the 44th Guards tbr [tank brigade][10] crossed the Western Bug and captured a bridgehead in the area of Dobriczin. During the night of 19 July, the formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 13th Army crossed to the bridgehead. In the morning, having crushed the enemy resistance, they liberated the town of Krystynopol. On the same day, the troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 3d Guards Army captured the city of Sokal and continued to advance successfully. The rear bodies also worked intensely. Thus, the supply reserves in the troops during the period of the crossing not only did not decline but even rose. This shows that the daily delivery not only replenished consumption but even surpassed it. Regardless of the difficult road conditions caused by the previous rains, motor transport operated continuously. The planned daily expenditure of materiel was no higher than the actual and this shows the high level of logistic support planning for the troops in the operation. The supplies were also replenished at the army dumps. The schedule for the delivery by rail was also carried out on time.



Organization of the Rear Services of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation

Key: 1--Location of rear services headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army on 12 July; 2--Army dumps and their detachments; 3--Head detachments of army dumps in the field; 4--Supply station (c/c) and unloading station (v/c); 5--Army hospital; 6--Detachment of medical facility (1st and 2d detachments); 7--Region for stationing army motor transport; 8--Army military road.

During the period of combat operations in the interfluve of the Western Bug and San rivers, the rear headquarters continuously followed behind the army command post. Characteristic here were the compact movement of the army rear units and continuous contact of the rear headquarters with the army command post and the troops. Due to the low pace of reconstruction on the railroads, as before Olyka and Dembowe Korczma remained the supply and unloading stations.

When the troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army reached the San (22 July) and were conducting combat operations in the area of Jaroslav and Peremysl, the army rear units and facilities did not move up behind the troops. Materiel was delivered by army transport along the route of Olyka, Stoyanov, Lubaczow and Jaroslav (more than 400 km). The drivers were on a trip from 1.5 to 2 days.

The army transport operated under great stress, as the Stoyanov railroad station still could not receive supply freight. Moreover, by this time 100 vehicles had been taken away from the motor pool for transporting pontoons and infantry while 65 vehicles of the 35th oatp were being used at the army base and the unloading station.[11] But, regardless of this, the troops had more ammunition than in crossing the Western Bug. The supply of tank ammunition was particularly high with 2.0-3.2 units of fire. The situation with fuel and lubricant was worse. Thus, in the II Guards Tank Corps the fuel supplies in certain units declined down to 0.6 fuelings. An analogous picture existed in the VIII Guards Mechanized Corps. This forced the corps commanders to issue fuel only to the combat units, and this led to a falling behind of the troop rear services with the supply reserves. At the same time the diesel supplies in the troops remained high and were 2-3 fuelings.

In order to accelerate the moving up of the troop supplies, the command upon the report of the chief of the army rear services allocated 50 vehicles from his motor transport. This made it possible for the rear staff in a short period of time to organize deliveries and bring the supply reserves closer to the troops and improve their availability. As for the army supplies, their volume did not decline with the start of the operation as the rail delivery of materiel was carried out without interruption. The rear staff of the front carefully watched the army supplies.

The army medical facilities by the end of 22 July were concentrated at Lobaczow and on the morning of the following day began to receive wounded and evacuate them to the hospital base of the 13th Army. Due to the heavy arrival of wounded, the army ambulance company was reinforced with 10 vehicles from equipment of the front. Moreover, empty transport was also widely used in evacuating wounded upon instructions of the army rear services staff.

On 26 July, the army received a new task: to hand over the occupied lines to concentrate in the area to the west of Lezajsk, to cross the Vistula without a halt and by the morning of 1 August to capture Opatow and Staszow with the forward detachments.

By the start of the crossing of the Vistula, the rear headquarters and the army rear units were concentrated in the area of Demba, but since on the left flank of the army, in the region of Zeszow, the enemy was showing greater activity and the army lines of communications could be exposed, by a decision of the military council the rear units as well as the rear headquarters were shifted to the forest to the

southwest of Baranow. During a period of 2-3 days, the wounded were evacuated from the hospitals.

In crossing the Vistula, and particularly during the battles on the Sandomir bridgehead, there was a sharp rise in the consumption of ammunition. The enemy was putting up stubborn resistance and trying at any price to hold on the Vistula line. For this reason the rear staff concentrated the basic efforts of the army motor transport in delivering ammunition for the tanks and the sau [self-propelled artillery mount]. Their supplies in the troops were 1.7-1.9 units of fire, and for the artillery somewhat less, 1.4-1.5 units of fire.[13]

From 6 August, the supply freight for the army began to be delivered by rail to the station of Novaya Greblya. This significantly facilitated the operations of motor transport, as the hauling distance was shortened to 150-200 km. Ammunition was delivered to the bridgehead by motor transport to the head detachments of the field army dumps in Sukhovolya, and for the artillery units often directly to the firing positions.

When the fiercest battles were underway to widen the bridgehead, the ammunition had to be brought up by army motor transport from the station of Dembowe Korczma as well, as the rail transport did not ensure its prompt delivery to the station of Novaya Greblya due to the limited capacity of the railroad. Then the delivery distance rose up to 300 km. For the troop transport, the delivery distance from the head detachments did not exceed 20 km. However, a significant portion of the troop motor transport due to the limited fuel (one fueling in 15 days) remained in the area of Demba. For the operation of the brigade exchange points it was decided to leave only four vehicles per point. In the corps during this period captured motor transport operating on diesel fuel was widely used.

By the end of the operation, supply reserves began to be delivered to the station of Zbydniow where an unloading station was opened up and a supply station was set up at Novaya Greblya station. Here all the army supply reserves were concentrated from the distant stations of Lutsk and Olyka by rail and motor transport.

The presence of hard-surfaced roads in the zone of the army advance helped to reduce the amount of work related to road support for the troops. In addition, the front road units provided great help and this significantly facilitated the task of the army road units. This made it possible for the chief of the army rear services to increase the composition of the head road detachment up to two bridge building and two provost traffic control companies. In the course of the operation, the road units of the 1st Guards Tank Army serviced 622 km of roads. The average length of the serviced section reached 80-120 km.

A heavy load also fell on the motor transport units of the army, the 35th oatb and the 282d oatb. As a total in the course of the operation, they transported 11,664 tons of various freight, including 2,629 tons of ammunition (22 percent), 1,113 tons of fuel (9 percent), 1,710 tons of food (16 percent) and 6,212 tons of other freight (53 percent). The volume of the basic types of materiel transported in the operation was 47 percent.

The experience of rear support during the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation affirmed that the rear services of a tank army should possess great mobility while its motor

transport should have sufficient carrying capacity ensuring prompt delivery of materiel over a significant distance. Even in the preparatory period the organization of the rear services for the 1st Guards Tank Army was based on long-range planning for supplying the troops in the course of the coming operation.

An important condition for the successful supply of the troops in the course of the operation was the correct echeloning of the supply reserves. A larger portion of the reserves was concentrated in the troops and not at the army dumps. This gave the units and formations great autonomy in conducting combat and excluded interruptions in the delivery of materiel to the troops. Characteristically, the supply reserves in the troops rose by the moment of commencing the crossing of water barriers (the Western Bug and San rivers).

When the transport distance rose and it was impossible to supply the required materiel, the staff of the army rear, considering the nature of combat operations, for example, the crossing of the Vistula, concentrated the basic efforts of motor transport on delivering chiefly the basic types of materiel. The priority delivery of ammunition and diesel fuel ensured the successful conduct of combat operations on the Vistula bridgehead for the tank and mechanized units and formations as well as the artillery ones.

The heavy destruction of the railroads did not make it possible to make maximum use of rail transport. For this reason, motor transport was the basic means of delivery in the course of the operation. Its successful operation was ensured by careful preparations prior to the start of combat operations.

With the troops 400 km and more away from the pab, it was essential to reinforce the army motor transport. There was the urgent question of the need to have in the tank army a mobile field army base which would not be dependent upon the railroad. With the operations of the tank army deep in the enemy defenses delivery of materiel by air could provide the most effective aid. In the course of the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation this was not done although the army rear staff planned for the receipt of supplies delivered by air.

The planning and organizing of control of the rear units and facilities were an important and responsible stage in the operation of the army rear services. With the high momentum of advance, the control of the army rear services using operations groups proved fully effective.

In the operation the personnel of the rear units and facilities showed great skill, courage and heroism. Hundreds of rear service personnel received high governmental decorations. By the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 August 1944, the Order of the Red Banner was presented to the 2d odeb and the 146th omsb for the exemplary carrying out of the missions of the command during the battles for the towns of Jaroslaw and Przemysl.

The experience of rear support for the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation has not lost its pertinence and to a certain degree can be used in training the personnel of the rear services control bodies under present-day-conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. By the start of the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation (13 July-29 August 1944), the 1st Guards Tank Army included: the VIII Guards Mechanized Corps, the XI Guards Tank Corps, the 64th Separate Tank Brigade, the 11th Separate Tank Regiment, the 6th omtsp [expansion unknown], the 399th Guards Separate Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, the 79th Guards Mortar Regiment, the 4th Guards Antiaircraft Battalion, the 11th Mortar Brigade, the 3d Guards Signal Regiment and other units (TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 300, inv. 13316, file 4, sheets 206-226).

2. Of the rear units and facilities, during this period the 1st Guards Tank Army included: the headquarters of the 99th PAB, the 186th and 187th Special Reconnaissance Detachment, the 35th oatb, the 282d oatb; the 2d odeb, the 146th omsb; the dumps; the 1606th smsi [expansion unknown], the 1467th, 3172d and 300th paas [field army artillery dump], the 390th and 1071st pasgsm [?field army dump for fuels and lubricants], the 272d pasbti [possibly field army dump for armored equipment], the 1736th pasai [expansion unknown], the 2960th pasis [expansion unknown], the 2953d paskhi [expansion unknown], the 2967th pasii [expansion unknown], the 2487th past [expansion unknown], the 1243d pasvi [expansion unknown]; the hospitals: the 470th and 583d khppg, the 1158th tppg, the 2734th Hospital for Lightly Wounded, the 4249th Hospital for Communicable Diseases; the 76th Field Clearing Station, the 46th Advance Section of Field Clearing Station; the 51st oodr [possibly, march support detachment], the 52d separate motorized medical company, the 25th medical evacuation section, the 74th and 470th pppo [expansion unknown], and the 25th pakh; the repair battalions: the 6th Separate Tank Repair Battalion, the 7th Separate Repair and Reconstruction Battalion, the 39th, 41st and 67th Evacuation Company, the 11th arst [collection of captured materiel and scrap metal] and the 83d apvp [expansion unknown] (TsAMO, folio 300, inv. 18816, file 4, sheets 163-179).

3. TsAMO, folio 300, inv. 37805, file 3, sheet 161.

4. Ibid., file 2, sheet 1.

5. Ibid., file 3, sheet 149.

6. Ibid., sheet 161; inv. 37935, file 3, sheets 124-129; folio 615, inv. 49295, file 2, sheets 5-6; folio 299, inv. 37941, file 7, sheet 90.

7. Ibid., folio 290, inv. 76781, file 11, sheet 112; inv. 52811, file 2, sheet 264.

8. Ibid., folio 615, inv. 49295, file 2, sheet 1; folio 299, inv. 76781, file 11, sheet 10.

9. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 76781, file 11, sheet 112.

10. The 44th Guards Tank Brigade in 1943 was equipped with tanks built with funds collected by Mongolian workers (TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 37935, file 3, sheets 124, 125).

11. TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 76781, file 11, sheet 115.

13. Ibid., inv. 37935, file 3, sheets 124, 125.

14. Ibid., sheet 112.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: RECONNAISSANCE IN A RIFLE DIVISION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 37-40

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Tactics" by Col R. Frolov: "Operations of a Reconnaissance Detachment"]

[Text] In January 1944, the 54th Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen S. P. Perkov) was on the defensive in the area to the northeast of Ukhta.[1] The right flank was exposed while the left was abutting to Lake Sredneye Kuyto. During the first days of January, the forward detachments began to receive information on the regrouping of the enemy troops ahead of the formation. At the same time the operation of several new radios was spotted. For varifying these data, the commander of the 26th Army, Maj Gen L. S. Skvirskiy, ordered the commander of the 54th sd [rifle division] to conduct reconnaissance with a reinforced reconnaissance detachment and take prisoners for interrogation. The main zone of enemy defenses was well fortified and had a large number of man-made structures and obstacles. For this reason it was very difficult to capture prisoners.

To the north of the 54th sd, enemy defenses consisted of individual platoon and company strongpoints. The communications between them were maintained only by meeting patrols. For this reason the army commander ordered the reconnaissance to be carried out precisely here, in the region of Lake Rego Yarvi (32 km to the north of Ukhta).[2]

For carrying out the given mission, the divisional commander formed up a reconnaissance detachment consisting of 375 men including: a separate ski battalion (commander, Maj A. N. Zabavka) consisting of two rifle companies and a reconnaissance platoon; a separate reconnaissance company (commander, Capt A. P. Ryzhkin); a company of submachine guns (commander, Lt A. D. Boncharov); platoons of horse and foot reconnaissance and a platoon of 50-mm mortars from the 81st Rifle Regiment. The soldiers and officers of these subunits had good ski training and good experience in combat under Karelian conditions. The deputy commander of the 81st Rifle Regiment, Maj M. P. Bogatyrev, was appointed commander of the detachment.[3]

The scouts were armed with 244 submachine guns, 33 rifles, 21 light machine guns and 2 50-mm mortars; there were 1.5 units of fire for ammunition and 2 hand grenades for every soldier. Food supplies for 9 days were created. The personnel was completely supplied with white clothing, three-quarter length sheepskin coats, felt boots and

warm undergarments. Each squad had 11 travois sleds and one pair of extra skis. Before leaving on the mission, the clothing and weapons were carefully inspected and the faultywere repaired and partially replaced with new.[4]

On the basis of the mission received, the divisional staff (chief of staff, Col N. G. Mavrodi) worked out a plan of operations for the scouts under which on the morning of 10 January they were to leave from the area of Ukhta and by the end of 11 January reach elev. 264. From here they plan to organize reconnaissance with the force of a platoon or company to the northwest as far as the eastern shore of Rego Yarvi for the purpose of ascertaining the positions of the enemy strongpoints in the area of Mikkinemi.

On the morning of 12 January, a portion of the detachment was to cross over the ice of Lake Rego Yarvi and to the north of Mikkinemi organize an ambush on the road running from the barracks to the southwest. If they did not succeed in taking prisoners, the subunit involved in the ambush was to engage the enemy which was at the nearest strongpoint and then, in retreating in the direction of elev. 264, lead the pursuers to within reach of the main forces.[6]

Communications with the divisional staff and with the subunit carrying out the mission was to be provided by five radios which existed in the detachment.

On 6 January, all the subunits which had been given the responsible reconnaissance mission were concentrated in the area of Ukhta, where up to 10 January they prepared for the coming search mission. In the combat training exercises they worked on the following subjects: "The Actions of a Platoon--Company in an Ambush on the Routes of Probable Enemy Movement," "The Advance of a Rifle Company in the Winter Through Wooded Terrain" and "The Organization of a March of a Rifle Company and Battalion in the Winter." From 7 through 9 January, there were three exercises (one of them at night) involving all the personnel. They worked through the subjects: "A March of a Rifle Battalion and Its Security," "A Rifle Company in an Ambush" and "Actions of a Reconnaissance Detachment in Encircling and Destroying the Enemy in a Strongpoint." All the exercises were conducted under the leadership of the commander of the 81st Rifle Regiment, Lt Col S. I. Sologub and divisional staff officers.[7]

During the preparations party political work was carried out continuously aimed at ensuring the carrying out of the mission. Each company had agitators who were instructed by the chief of the political section in the division, Lt Col I. T. Shchlyuyev. Political exercises were held regularly in the detachment. Every day resumes of Sovinformbyuro [Soviet Information Bureau] were read to the soldiers and sergeants.

On 10 January, at 0700 hours, the scouts left the area of Ukhta for the site of the forthcoming operations. The route lay across roadless terrain, through forests, in parallel to the line of enemy strongpoints, some 12-17 km from them. This provided an opportunity to move covertly. In the first half of January 1944, in Karelia there were severe frosts accompanied by snowstorms. The depth of the snow cover here at that time reached 70 km and for this reason it was virtually impossible to move without skis.

The troops moved in a column of twos, having a company of submachine gunners from the 81st Rifle Regiment in the point of vanguard, ahead of whom moved patrols at a distance of 100-150 m. The main forces followed 400-600 m behind the point of vanguard. The rear of the march formation was brought up by a rear party consisting of one rifle platoon. The commander of the detachment was at the head of the column of main forces. Communications on the march was provided from the point of vanguard by messengers and in the column of the main forces by voice and signal flags. After every 50 minutes of march there was a 10-minute halt.[8]

By 1200 hours on 11 January, the subunits were concentrated in the area of the designated elev. 264.[10]



Actions of reconnaissance detachment in capturing prisoners in the area of Lake Rego Yarvi on 10-18 January 1944

Immediately Maj M. P. Bogatyrev sent out the first company of the ski battalion under the command of Capt N. A. Govorin to the southern shore of Lake Rego Yarvi for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy and organizing an ambush, while the remaining forces of the detachment made camp for the night. On 13 January at 0400 hours, the second company of the ski battalion under the command of Sr Lt G. R. Gadzhiyev left in a northwestern direction with the same mission as the first company. In addition, it was ordered to continue skiing along the eastern shore of Lake Rego Yarvi for linking up with the first company. The remaining subunits, having spent the night in the area of elev. 264, during the first half of the day were assembled in the forest 1.5 km to the east of Mikkinemi. Here the detachment commander organized an all-round defense, and himself with a platoon from the reconnaissance company of the division reconnoitered in the direction of Mikkinemi. In the course of this enemy strongpoints were established in Mikkinemi and 1 km to the northeast, between the strongpoints, there was one pillbox. The communication of these strongpoints with the western bank of Lake Rego Yarvi was maintained over the ice. Having assessed the situation, M. P. Bogatyrev decided to alter the initial plan of action and take prisoners in the strongpoint in the area of the barracks.[11]

In accord with the new plan of actions, the detachment returned to the area of elev. 264. On the way back it was joined by the second company of the ski battalion. The first company was ordered to continue carrying out the mission given it.[12]

The detachment commander had thought of taking prisoners on the road running from the barracks to Mikkinemi and here they planned to organize an ambush. However the carrying out of this plan had to be put off due to the fact that the frost became more severe, a snowstorm started and there were many cases of frostbite among the personnel. M. P. Bogatyrev decided to set out small bonfires. He ordered the first company of the ski battalion to link up with the main forces. By the end of the day it had arrived at the designated area.

During the night the snowstorm abated and it was decided at dawn of 15 January to head for the area planned for the ambush. By 0700 hours, the reconnaissance detachment in full force was concentrated 1 km to the southwest of Lake Kando Lambi. A platoon from the submachine gun company was assigned to ambush the road to the south of the barracks. The platoon was ordered to make passageways through the barriers built by the enemy along the road and to conceal itself in direct proximity to it. It was planned that with the appearance of the enemy the platoon by a surprise attack was to take prisoners and then retreat to the detachment's position. For guarding the passageways through the barriers, another platoon was assigned from the submachine company.[13]

The submachine gunners, under the command of Lt T. I. Tishkov, having moved forward in the designated direction, cut passageways through the barriers and before reaching the road, discovered fresh ski tracks. Having dug foxholes in the snow and having camouflaged them, they waited in ambush 1 km to the south of the barracks.

In the morning of 16 January, the first company of the ski battalion set out to reconnoiter the areas to the north of the ambush, but did not discover anything here. On the way back the company commander, Capt Govorin, upon his own initiative as reinforcement for the ambush left one platoon from his company under the command of Lt G. P. Smirnov. At 1100 hours on 16 January, Smirnov spotted an enemy group consisting of 30 men moving on skis from the barracks area toward Mikkinemi.[14]

Having allowed the enemy to draw near, both platoons with concentrated fire destroyed 25 enemy soldiers and took one prisoner. Our soldiers did not have any losses in this engagement and returned safely with the prisoner to the detachment's position.[15]

The enemy, having detected our ambush at the road, decided to outflank it on the southeast and destroy it. At 1200 hours, more than 200 enemy soldiers left the area of the barns to the south, moving along the southern shore of Lake Kando Lambi.[16] They approached the position of the reconnaissance company of the division which was in snow foxholes on the southern shore of the lake. Having allowed them to draw near, the company opened up with heavy submachine gun, rifle and machine gun fire and then attacked in the flank.

Not able to withstand the rapid attack, the enemy began to retreat to the north in panic. In this brief engagement the reconnaissance company killed up to 30 men and captured one radio operator with a radio.[17] At 1300 hours, the entire detachment was concentrated at elev. 264. During the night Maj M. P. Bogatyrev reported to the divisional staff on the capturing of prisoners and was ordered to return to the positions of the formation.

The prisoners provided valuable information on the enemy grouping in the designated area. The detachment had prepared well for carrying out the mission. During the 8 days of action under conditions of the Karelian winter, its soldiers and officers showed great physical endurance. Regardless of the failures of the first days, the scouts worked steadily toward their goal and on the 6th day carried out the mission. They successfully routed the enemy from the ambush, in skillfully using the firing of small arms from short distances and at point-blank range. The availability of a sufficient number of radios made it possible for the detachment commander to maintain constant contact with the divisional staff and to efficiently direct the subunits. The detachment commander and the officers acted intelligently and with initiative.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 1168, inv. 1, file 25, sheet 7.

2. Ibid., file 100, sheet 18; file 106, sheet 4.

3. Ibid., file 100, sheet 19; file 106, sheet 4.

4. Ibid., file 100, sheet 19.

6. Ibid., file 106, sheets 5, 6.

7. Ibid., file 100, sheet 19.

8. Ibid., file 106, sheet 5.

10. Ibid., file 106, sheets 5, 6; file 100, sheet 19.

11. Ibid., file 106, sheets 5,6; file 100, sheet 29.

12. Ibid., file 100, sheet 19.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: RIFLE BATTALION IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 41-44

[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" and with the subheading "Tactics" by Lt Col V. Timofeyev: "Defensive Combat of a Rifle Battalion"]

[Text] A part of an enemy grouping numbering 10,000-12,000 men surrounded in the area of the town of Schneidemühl during the night of 14 February 1945 broke through the front of encirclement and moved north for linking up with its troops in the area of the population point of Landeck.

The first column of Nazis (up to 3,500 soldiers and officers with 30 assault guns, 10 tanks, a battalion of 105-mm cannons, a battery of 150-mm guns and 2 batteries of 75-mm assault guns), without encountering heavy resistance, by 1600 hours on 14 February had captured Tarnowka and with the onset of darkness its forward subunits had occupied Hohenvier and reached the rear of the 23d Guards Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen P. M. Shafarenko) which was on the defensive along a broad front (up to 25 km).[1]

In the situation which had developed, the commander of the XII Guards Rifle Corps, Maj Gen A. F. Kazankin, brought up from his second echelon to the threatened sector the 469th Rifle Regiment (commander, Col M. A. Mochalov) from the 150th Rifle Division with the task of destroying the enemy which had broken through. At 1600 hours on 14 February 1945, the commander of the 23d Guards Rifle Division ordered the commander of the 469th sp [rifle regiment] to defend the line of Flederborn, Strasfort, Radawnitz, and not to permit the enemy to break through in the sectors of Jastrow, Landeck; Hohenvier, Landeck; Hohenvier, Kolpin.[2]

The third battalion of this regiment was to defend Radawnitz with two rifle companies, preventing the enemy from breaking through on the axis of Hohenvier, Kolpin, and with one rifle company to hold the region of mark 131.8 (2.5 km to the west of Radawnitz), covering the road of Hohenvier--Flederborn and then on to Landeck, in skirting Radawnitz. On the right in the region of Strassfort the 1/469 sp was on the defensive and to the left there were no adjacent units.[3]

By 1700 hours, the 3d sb [rifle battalion] consisting of 364 men was concentrated on the northeastern edge of Radawnitz, armed with 274 rifles, 44 submachine guns, 16 light and 9 medium machine guns, 6 antitank guns, 2 45-mm guns and 6 82-mm mortars.[4] Attached to the subunit were: a battery of the separate tank-destroying artillery battalion of the 171st Rifle Division, a battery from the 185th Separate Tank Destroying Artillery Battalion and a platoon of combat engineers. Combat operations were supported by the 2d Cannon Artillery Battalion of the 328th Artillery Regiment.

The battalion commander, Capt S. D. Khachaturov, having set out battle outposts in the area of the nameless hill (1.5 km to the southwest of Radawnitz), conducted reconnaissance with the commanders of the companies from the attached and supporting subunits.

Having studied the situation, Capt S. D. Khachaturov decided to concentrate the main efforts on holding the southwestern edge of Radawnitz and gave the following tasks to the subunits:

The 7th Rifle Company (commander, Capt V. M. Sobolev) with a battery of the 185th Separate Tank Destroyer Artillery Battalion of the 171st Rifle Division, with two medium machine guns and two antitank guns was to defend elev. 131.8 and not allow the enemy to break through in the direction of Hohenvier, Landeck.

The 9th Rifle Company (commander, Sr Lt A. M. Bombin) with a battery of the 185th Tank Destroyer Artillery Battalion, a machine gun platoon and a combat engineer squad was to defend the southwestern part of Radawnitz. A battery of the 185th Tank Destroyer Division was to move up into the area of the brick plant and provide artillery cover for the Radawnitz--Hohenvier road. Firing positions of the medium machine guns were to be set up on the flanks of the company.

The 8th Rifle Company (commander, Sr Lt A. M. Sunko), without the 3d platoon and with a platoon of 45-mm guns and medium machine guns, with a squad of antitank guns and a squad of combat engineers, was to hold the southeastern part of Radawnitz preventing the enemy infantry and tanks from breaking through in the direction of Radawnitz, Kolpin.

A platoon of 45-mm guns was to move up to the southern edge of Radawnitz and take up firing positions along the Flatow--Radawnitz highway. A squad of antitank guns was to deploy in the stone buildings and a platoon of medium machine guns on the company's flanks.

A mortar company (commander, Sr Lt D. K. Semakov) was to organize combat positions in the region of the church and prepare fire against Hohenvier, the northern edge of Neuhof and the grove to the south of Radawnitz.

The battalion commander left as the reserve the 3d Rifle Platoon of the 8th Rifle Company with a squad of antitank guns and one medium machine gun. The platoon was located on the northern edge of Radawnitz ready for counterattacks in the direction of the western and southwestern edges of the defended settlement.[5]

By 1800 hours, the company commanders had led their subunits to the areas assigned to them for defense, they had given the tasks to the rifle platoons and to the gun

and machine gun crews and had indicated to them the area of fire and the lines at which there was to be concentrated fire. The personnel immediately began to dig foxholes and adapt the stone buildings and wooden structures for defenses. Regardless of the frozen ground, during the night the men dug foxholes for firing from a kneeling and standing position, firing positions for the guns, machine guns, mortars and antitank guns. In the buildings and structures loopholes and embrasures were created for firing the machine guns, antitank rifles, rifles and submachine guns. The weapons were positioned in such a manner that all the approaches to Radawnitz came under cross and flanking fire by rifles, machine guns and artillery.[6]

At 0930 hours on 15 February, up to a company of enemy infantry with the support of five assault guns and artillery fire, having knocked out the battle outposts, attacked Radawnitz from the southwest. Having suffered significant losses from the artillery-mortar and rifle-machine gun fire, the enemy retreated to the elevation to the northeast of Hohenvier.[7]

At 1100 hours, the Nazis with a force up to an infantry battalion with eight assault guns, with the support of heavy artillery fire, attacked the positions of the 9th Rifle Company, but, having encountered organized fire from our infantry and artillery, again retreated to the initial position.

For reinforcing the artillery grouping in the region of Radawnitz, the commander of the 23d Guards Rifle Division sent here from the division's unattacked defensive sectors the 1st and 3d battalions of the 49th Guards Artillery Regiment (commanders, respectively, Capt I. S. Korobov and Maj A. G. Kuznetsov), the 163d Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment (commander, Lt Col F. F. Bondarenko), three batteries from the 1072 9th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, a battalion from the 136th Army Cannon Artillery Brigade.

At 1300 hours, he himself arrived in Radawnitz to direct the engagement of the units and subunits for the formation positioned here.

From 1200 to 1400 hours, enemy artillery fired intensely on this population point. Fires broke out in it. At 1400 hours, up to 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers with 25 assault guns and 10 tanks, with the support of heavy artillery fire attacked the battalion's battle formations.[8]

The Nazis succeeded in breaking into the western edge of Radawnitz and capturing the brick plant and the church. During 3 hours of intense combat, certain buildings exchanged hands several times. The Soviet soldiers with great courage defended every house and every structure, causing the enemy significant losses in personnel and equipment.

Thus, the rifle squad under the command of Sgt S. Ye. Serdyuk was surrounded in a stone building on the western edge of Radawnitz. To the repeated offers of surrender the men responded with heavy, organized fire. The enemy did not succeed in breaking the strong resistance of the defenders. Having lost up to 50 men killed and wounded, the Nazis retreated in this area of the defenses.

The artillery troops also fought courageously. In the first battery of the 28th Separate Guards Tank Destroyer Artillery Battalion, just one gun remained under the



Defensive engagement of the 3/469 Rifle Regiment in the region of Radawnitz on 14 February 1945

command of Sgt S. I. Sinitsyn. Tanks and assault guns were advancing on the position of the battery. But the crew did not flinch and hit one tank and three assault guns and destroyed several-score enemy soldiers and officers.

The Nazi tanks and assault guns succeeded in breaking through into the rear of the second battery of the 49th Guards Artillery Regiment which occupied firing positions on the southwestern edge of Radawnitz. The gun commander, Sr Sgt O. V. Bykov, did not lose his head. With an accurate round, he hit an assault gun and the enemy infantry which had broken through was met with fire from personal weapons and grenades. The entire crew perished in the combat, but did not retreat a single step. The battery commander, Lt V. N. Chupira, in taking over for the gunner, with a round from a distance of 200 m hit a German "Tiger" tank and then set two assault guns on fire.[9]

By 1600 hours, the Nazi infantry had captured the central part of Radawnitz. Its attempts to break through in a northernly direction were driven off by organized fire from the guns firing with direct laying and by the self-propelled artillery mounts from a hill to the north of this population point.

Having assessed the situation, the battalion commander took the decision to counterattack the enemy from the north using his reserve and from the west by the 7th Rifle Company. As a result of the counterattack which commenced at 1630 hours, the Nazis lost up to 30 soldiers and officers that were driven out of just one building. The subunits of the battalion also suffered significant losses. It was obvious that the enemy grouping was engaged in a battle for Radawnitz and did not intend to seek outflanking routes to break through to Landeck. Under these conditions, Capt Khachaturov ordered the 7th Rifle Company to outflank the Nazis along the route of mark 160.5 and Mariannenhof and to link up with the forces defending Radawnitz. By 1700 hours, the 7th Rifle Company with five self-propelled artillery mounts had reached the area of the separate houses to the north of Radawnitz.

By this time, by a forced march, Radawnitz had been reached by the 164th Rifle Regiment of the 33d Rifle Division which by a decision of the corps commander had temporarily been transferred to the commander of the 23d Guards Rifle Division. After 15 minutes of intensive shelling by all the artillery on the central and western parts of Radawnitz, at 1730 hours the men of the 3d Battalion of the 469th and 164th Rifle regiments, upon the order of the divisional commander, counterattacked the enemy from the north and east. Unable to withstand the rapid attack, the enemy, in suffering great casualties, began to retreat in disorder in the direction of Hohenvier. Its scattered groups, having abandoned the equipment, ran off through the forests.

In the battle for Radawnitz, over 600 Nazi soldiers and officers, 12 assault guns, 3 tanks, 16 guns of different caliber, 27 machine guns and 13 trucks were destroyed; 286 men were taken prisoner and 3 assault guns, 1 tank, 17 machine guns, 4 guns of various caliber, 40 rifles and 160 submachine guns were captured.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO, folio 1268, inv. 1, file 65, sheet 43.

2. Ibid., file 52, sheets 52, 53.

3. Ibid., file 91, sheet 6.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., folio 1097, inv. 1, file 6, sheet 45.

6. Ibid., file 91, sheet 7.

7. Ibid., sheet 8.

8. Ibid., sheet 10.

9. Ibid., file 65, sheet 46.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: ARMY OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 45-51

[Conclusion of two-part article published under the heading " Memoirs" by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Arm Gen A. Beloborodov: "In the Hills of Manchuria"*]

[Text] During the night of 9 August, the 1st Red Banner Army together with the other armies of the First Far Eastern Front went over to the offensive. It developed successfully. By the end of the day, the XXVI and LIX Rifle Corps, in destroying individual Japanese strongpoints, had crossed approximately one-half of the distance across the taiga. The forward units had reached the Shitouhe River. Some 6-12 km remained until the reaching of roads. During the night the main forces of the corps and the tank brigades attached to them were brought up to the river. Having assessed the situation, I determined that it was time to commit the tanks to battle. In acting as the forward detachments, the 257th Tank Brigade of Lt Col G. S. Anishchik (the XXVI Rifle Corps) and the 75th Tank Brigade of Lt Col L. D. Krupetskiy (the LIX Rifle Corps) were to break through the enemy defenses and capture the crossings on the Mulinghe River: the first in the area of the town of Muling, and the second in the area of the town of Lishuzhen and simultaneously cut the railroad which was close to us at these points. By the end of 10 August, the 257th Brigade had broken into Muling, having seized the bridge and the railroad junction, and had commenced a fierce battle with the constantly counterattacking Japanese troops. On the next day, with the bringing up of the rifle regiments from the 22d Division to the town, the enemy was driven completely out of it.

The 75th Tank Brigade fought just as effectively. Its first tanks broke through to the Lishuzhen bridge. The Japanese were preparing to blow it up. But the combat engineers succeeded in deactivating the charges. The rifle regiment of the 39th Division which arrived by evening reinforced the success of the tank troops.

By the end of the third day of the offensive, the army assault grouping had broken through to 40 km into the enemy defenses, having widened the breakthrough area to 30 km.

---

*Conclusion. For beginning see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1980.

The group of Gen A. N. Maksimov fought successfully in covering the assault grouping on the north, from the side of the Mishan fortified area of the Japanese. By the evening of 11 August, in assaulting pillbox after pillbox, this group and one rifle company from the LIX Corps broke deep into the Japanese fortified area, it reached the Mulinghe River and established contact with the reconnaissance groups from the 35th Army which was moving against the town of Mishan from the north.

The reconnaissance data received by the army staff, including air reconnaissance, showed that the enemy was attempting to rapidly regroup, in pulling troops from the area of Mishan-Boli back to Mudanjiang, to its rear defensive line. If the enemy command succeeded in carrying out its plans, it would have a rather impressive grouping. It was essential to defeat the enemy while on the move. In our area the initial point of the lateral rail line was located in the town of Linkou. The forward detachment of the LIX Corps, the 75th Tank Brigade, was headed toward it. And the forward detachment of the XXVI Corps, the 257th Tank Brigade, was to cut the line further south, in the region of Hualin Station. To a great degree the success of the entire assault grouping depended upon their rapid and bold actions deep in the enemy rear. For this reason, from 12 to 15 August, the forward detachments were at the center of attention at the army command and staff. I must say immediately that an exceptionally great responsibility fell on the 257th Tank Brigade of Lt Col Georgiy Stepanovich Anishchik. Although during the 4 years of the Great Patriotic War I had witnessed many tank breakthroughs and raids against the enemy rear, the raid of the 257th Tank Brigade was one of the most remarkable in terms of the heroism of the tank troops and the results.

On the morning of 12 August, the brigade which was located several kilometers to the west of the city of Muling, got underway. Again there were mountain defiles, narrow cornices and sharp turns.

Having passed the pass, the tanks approached Kouzihe. Here the road somewhat widened but still only two tanks could move abreast, and almost touching. They could already see wooden farm houses where explosions thundered. Japanese antitank cannons were firing from the hills. The column came to a halt and returned the fire. Finding a bypass, the tank troops broke deep into the strongpoint and the battle raged. The tank motors roared over the hills, among the tangle of trenches, pillboxes, shelters and artillery positions, over the cliffs and in front of the inaccessible grades, the Japanese cannons fired frequently and the brush and grass caught fire. This battle lasted more than an hour and was probably the bloodiest since the start of combat operations. Finally, the enemy gave way and hundreds of its retreating soldiers were scattered over the slopes of the hills and the valley of the swampy stream. The tanks of Lts Bezusov, Vorob'yev, Borshch, Kisarov, Shevelev and Shishkin pursued the fleeing troops. Victory was achieved at a dear price. Sr Lt V. N. Dmitriyev and Lt G. G. Bezrukov, the commander of the reconnaissance platoon Lt Demin and the Komsomol organizer of the submachine gun company Sgt Zotov had died a hero's death. Many sustained severe wounds.

It was around 15 km from Kouzihe to the railroad, but the route was a difficult one. Having made a difficult march over swamps, the brigade consisting of 19 tanks during the second half of 12 August reached the Linkou--Mudanjiang railroad and without a pause attacked the Japanese military camp at Xiadung siding. This was a supply depot of the Kwantung Army. Lt Col G. S. Anishchik radioed that they had captured 40 dumps with various military supplies. He added that the tanks had replenished their fuel supplies.

The brigade commander led his tanks to the south, toward Hualin station. At 0500 hours, the brigade, having destroyed a large ammunition train along the way, without a pause captured the station. Around 10 km remained to Mudanjiang, but it was less than 2 km to the Hualin bridges over which the railroad and dirt road crossed from the eastern bank of the river to the western and then ran further.

The tanks rushed towards the bridges, but when they drew near, a roar of an explosion rang out and the iron beams fell into the river. The Japanese artillery fired from the hills, scores of machine guns chattered, and from roadside ditches and camouflaged "foxholes" emerged soldiers in greenish field jackets and bent under the load of the mines and explosive charges fastened to them, ran toward the tanks. The Soviet soldiers fired the submachine guns at point-blank range and threw grenades. The "suicide troops" were cut down by bursts of the tank machine guns. They did not retreat until all were killed.

Two hours later the tank troops repeated the attack. But the enemy had brought up new detachments of "suicide troops" from Mudanjiang and also artillery. The attempts of the field engineers to clear passageways through the minefield were unsuccessful as they could not make their way to it because of the heavy fire.

By 1800 hours on 13 August, Lt Col G. S. Anishchik again led the tanks into Hualin where they took up the defensive along the southern edge of the station settlement. The Japanese immediately undertook an attack. A battle broke out.

After midnight, when it became clear that the station could not be held, Lt Col G. S. Anishchik gave the order to retreat. The tanks broke out of the encirclement and moved north, along the railroad toward Linkou. The brigade took up the defensive in the hills a kilometer away from Hualin station. This area was chosen because here a small stream with steep banks flowed into the Mudanjiang River.

On the morning f 14 August, Lt Col G. S. Anishchik received his first reinforcements, two self-propelled artillery battalions (around 25 vehicles) from the 22d and 300th Rifle divisions. He immediately undertook an attack on Hualin station. The previous difficult night and the high casualties had obviously had an effect on the enemy and primarily on its morale. The Soviet tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] had scarcely appeared before the station when the Japanese retreated. Hualin was captured by the tank troops with few casualties. Characteristically, after that night the chief of the political section N. K. Rol'bin reported to the brigade commander that 30 tank troops had expressed a desire to join the party.[1] The men wrote their applications differently: some were longer and others shorter. However each man inevitably added: "If I perish in combat I want to be considered a communist." In my opinion, these words characterize the moral state and fighting spirit of the men in the 257th Tank Brigade.

While the brigade of G. S. Anishchik, having finally gained possession of Hualin station, was f aly astride the Linkou--Mudanjiang lateral line, at the other end of this line, the forward detachment from the corps of Gen Ksenofontov continued to destroy the screens [roadblocks] by which the Japanese command had endeavored to cover the retreat of their main forces toward Mudanjiang. Thus, the enemy was squeezed on both sides and its attempt to reinforce the Mudanjiang grouping by pulling back formations from the Mishan grouping into this area did not succeed.

On 14 August, the Japanese endeavored to catch Ksenofontov's corps in a mountain defile at Chushan station, but the 75th Tank Brigade of Lt Col Krupetskiy drove them off. After the capturing of Sandaohezi (35 km to the northeast of Hualin station), the forward detachment of Lt Col Krupetskiy no longer encountered organized resistance. By the end of 14 August, the staff of the First Red Banner Army could state with certainty that it had succeeded in thwarting the maneuvering of men and equipment as planned by the command of the 5th Japanese Army while the capturing of Hualin station had created the necessary prerequisites for the storming of Mudanjiang.

The operational advantage which the XXVI Corps had gained as a result of the rapid breakthrough toward Mudanjiang was somewhat reduced by the unfavorable balance of infantry forces. The enemy had brought up into this area the remnants of three divisions (the 124th, 126th and 135th)[2] the total number of which was set at about 15,000-20,000. In addition it had brought up from the reserve the 122d Infantry Division (15,000 men) and the 1st Motorized Brigade of "suicide troops." We had available just four rifle regiments from the 22d and 300th divisions, since the remaining regiments were in the rear in building roads and column tracks. Thus, 7,000-8,000 of our rifle troops could be involved in the storming of Mudanjiang.

The maneuver of capturing the Mudanjiang enemy grouping was impeded by natural obstacles in the form of mountains and swamps. But the main one was the river. Fast-flowing, up to 200 m wide and up to 2 m deep, it formed a semicircle around the town. Three roads led to it across bridges: from the north from Linkou the Hualin, from the east from Muling, and from the south from the town of Ninan. The Hualin bridges had been blown up and hence our immediate objective was to break through and capture the bridges close to the eastern edge of the town, at Eho station. They also could be blown up. Then the tanks would go farther, to the southern bridges at the suburb at Ehozhan. But the capturing of these bridges in fact was rather problematic. While the tanks fought 10 km from Hualin station to Eho or the same distance to the suburb of Ehozhan, the enemy would not sit by idly. Consequently, simultaneously with the main thrust along the eastern bank of the river toward Eho station we would also have to attack along the western bank directly against Mudanjiang. We would ferry the rifle battalions across in the area of Hualin on makeshift craft and outflank the town on the northwest.

This plan began to develop several days before the storming. The army staff headed by Gen F. F. Maslennikov devoted great attention to the new combat mission. Here the personality of Fedor Fedorovich [Maslennikov] could be felt. He himself was not given to emotions and directed his assistants to get to work. Excessive optimism and the flush of military successes tend to grow into flippancy. Maslennikov checked such moods with all severity.

We knew that the town of Mudanjiang had been strongly reinforced and that on the approaches to it there were not only previously prepared field defenses but also permanent brick and concrete structures. But the capabilities of these defenses could only be fully assessed in the course of combat when they had to be broken up.

On the first half of the day of 15 August, the main forces of the 22d and 300th Rifle divisions as well as the 72d Tank Brigade of Lt Col I. F. Morozov were concentrated at Hualin station. Arriving with them was the staff operations group headed

by general Skvortsov. He immediately organized a reconnaissance in force along the highway toward Uho station, and in the second half of the day the 300th Rifle Division of Gen K. G. Cherepanov, together with the 257th Tank Brigade, went over to an offensive along the eastern bank of the river. Simultaneously the regiments of the 22d Division under Gen N. K. Svirs prepared to cross to the western bank by the Hualin bridges.

When the commander of the army artillery, Gen K. P. Kazakov, and the chief of the engineer troops, Col M. N. Safonov and I were traveling to the observation post of the corps commander, the battle was at its peak. The report of Gen Skvortsov was no source of pleasure. In the main sector, Cherepanov's division was making headway slowly. The road from Hualin station to Eho station had been mined, and the tanks were advancing with difficulty. Nor were things going well with the crossing of the division of Gen Svirs in the area of the blown up bridges. We resolved: Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov would remain here and help the artillery troops of the corps, Maksim Nikolayevich Safonov would leave for the crossing and I would go to the 300th Division, to Cherepanov.

Korniliy Georgiyevich Cherepanov was in a difficult situation. His division was to make the main thrust, and he had few troops. The order stated: "The 300th Rifle Division..." and so forth, but what about the real situation? One regiment was still on the march. The second regiment of Mikhail Frolovich Buzhak had been deployed facing the east in order to cover the division from the left. And thus it turned out that with tank support only the 1049th Regiment of Lt Col Konstantin Vasil'yevich Panin was advancing to the south, to Eho station.

The enemy resisted fiercely and the Japanese command realized that a breakthrough by our tanks and infantry to Eho station could immediately collapse the entire defense along the Mudanjiang River. In advancing along its eastern bank, Cherepanov's division would strike the rear of the Japanese grouping holding off the pressure of our adjacent unit, the LXV Rifle Corps. We did not have flank communications with it, but operational cooperation had been created. The stronger the attack by the LXV Corps the easier it would be for Cherepanov. And conversely, the success of the 300th Division would immediately be felt in the area of the adjacent unit.

With great difficulty, my aide and I made our way to Gen Cherepanov. Together with the deputy corps commander, Col Lubyagin, he was near the village of Nanchangzi. We were approaching and suddenly it seemed as though an avalanche had descended. There was a roar, confusion and the whistle of shrapnel. Neither then nor now can I recall whether I saw Korniliy Georgiyevich or not. I realized that I was standing up and not lying down as a soldier under fire should do in such instances. Around craters were smoking and the earth was smoldering. It was if I were in the crater of an active volcano. And ahead of me, some 10 steps, lay a man covered with pieces of dirt with a very pale face, bleeding from underneath the ripped sleeve of a general's coat. It was Korniliy Georgiyevich! I rushed to him: "Korniliy, my friend!" He was silent and his eyes were closed. I put my ear to his chest but could I, myself stunned, hear his heart? The medics rushed up. "He is alive," they told me. "Our commander is alive but he must get quickly to the first aid station as he is severely wounded." He was sent to the rear, the physicians saved his life but my old comrade in arms lost an arm.

I assigned the command of the division to Col Lubyagin.

Until late in the evening of 15 August I was at the command post of the 1049th Regiment with its commander, Konstantin Vasil'yevich Panin, and I saw what a price was exacted for each step toward the objective of Eho station. The mountain road from Nanchangzi to the south was literally full of "suicide troops." Their nests were located even within the minefields. The rifle battalions of Capts Ye. N. Baybus, D. I. Sindyashkin and I. P. Artemenko advanced along with the tanks and our intrepid combat engineers were ahead, making passageways through the minefields under heavy enemy artillery and machine gun fire, simultaneously destroying the "suicide troops" in hand-to-hand engagements.

By the end of the day, the rifle troops of Lt Col Panin, with the support of tanks from the 77th and 257th brigades, had reached t[illegible]ine of the Cimeipalo stream and the village of the same name. The village stood on the eastern bank of the Mudanjiang River. Here we dug in for the night. Another approximately 5 km remained to Eho station.

When I returned to the observation post of Gen Skvortsov, he reported immediately that the crossing of the 22d Division of Gen Svirs had been carried out successfully. In advancing to the south, it had reached the level of the 300th Division so that only the river separated their flanks. Now the 211th and 246th regiments were just 4-5 km from the northern edge of Mudanjiang and its freight station.

Although here, in the north of the town, enemy defenses were as a whole not so strong as the position before the bridge at Eho station, the 22d Division did not have either artillery or tanks. Its commander, Nikolay Karpovich Svirs, assured us that the Red Army riflemen would carry out their mission. "The Russian bayonette will help us out," he said. "We will stand up and move forward without noise. Lt Borodavka has already been to the very station." Intrepid platoon commander of the horse reconnaissance had succeeded not only in making his way into the rear of the Japanese Northern Military Camp and the nearby strongpoints but had also brought prisoners from there. They were from the 121st Infantry Division.

The pending attack by the 22d Division without artillery support and tanks led me to the idea of putting off the artillery softening up in the zone of the main attack, at Eho station. If the rifle troops of Gen Svirs were to suddenly break into the town from the north and begin street battles, they in fact would be in the rear of the enemy defending the fortifications in front of the bridge. Then we would release the artillery and the ground attack aviation. This tactical move with a change, even a forced one, in the ordinary procedure of advance would ensure surprise. And surprise meant success. Particularly as yesterday's attempt by the 300th Division to break through to Eho station had probably forced the Japanese command to reinforce this sector at the expense of the secondary one, that is, the units defending the western bank.

Approximately these considerations lay at the basis of the attack on Mudanjiang without artillery softening up. The changes which were made in the previously elaborated plan for the storming of Mudanjiang had involved new changes. Initially the infantry attack had been set for 0900 hours as it was essential to wait until the fog dispersed and the artillery could carry out aimed firing. But since the artillery

softening up had been canceled, the infantry attack was moved to an earlier hour, 0700 hours. Let me anticipate the question: And why at 0700 hours and not earlier, at dawn? Because, Gen Svirs reported only by 0600 hours that the 22d Division had taken up its jump-off positions for the offensive. And we gave him another hour to complete the final preparations.

At the designated hour the battalions of the 22d and 300th Divisions went over to the attack. On the eastern bank of the river, in the main zone of the enemy defenses, a very intense battle broke out with hand-to-hand combat breaking out here and there. The regiments of Panin and Buzhak slowly but surely advanced through the field fortifications toward Eho station. An hour later the rocket artillery struck. The eastern military camp and pillboxes on the heights were filled with smoke and the loud explosions showed that the rocket shells had reached the ammunition dumps. The tanks of Anishchik and Morozov were in front and the ground attack aviation was flying over Mudanjiang. Then came a hopeful report from the commander of the 300th Division:

"Panin's regiment at Eho station, the tanks are attacking the bridges."

And 10 minutes later:

"The bridges have been blown up."

"All three?" interrupted Gen Skvortsov.

"All of them!"

"Your plan?"

"I am sending both tank brigades and SAU battalions on further, to Ehozhan, to the southern bridges. The infantry is preparing make-shift gear and will cross the river here by the destroyed bridges."

Skvortsov looked at me. What could one say? Col Lubyagin was acting correctly.

"Tell Lubyagin about the pontoons," I reminded him.

He nodded and said into the microphone:

"Plan approved. Mount Buzhak's regiment on the tanks. A bridge company of Sr Lt Khromov is on its way to you. Meet it."

Sr Lt Khromov with his own company and with captured Japanese pontoons pulled up at Eho station, by the blown-up bridges, and under enemy fire was soon erecting a floating bridge.

In the meanwhile, the attempt of the 300th Division to move the battalions across the river to the eastern suburbs without a pause and on makeshift craft had not been successful. The six pillboxes of the strongpoint which were on a hill behind the bridges fired heavily. Three lines of Japanese infantry trenches ran from the edge of the water girdling the high bank. Scores of machine guns fired from here and the water boiled from the bullets.

"No matter, we will win out!" said Gen Skvortsov. "Nikolay Karpovich will get them."

And in fact, the 22d Division of Nikolay Karpovich Svirs which was to be used for the auxiliary attack was advancing on the northern edge of Mudanjiang so energetically that its advance during these morning hours became crucial for the overall success of the storming. Without tanks and artillery, with just firearms and light mortars it had rapidly broken through the fortified enemy position on the western bank of the river. Obviously the nighttime crossing of the six battalions in the area of the Hualin bridges had escaped the attention of the Japanese scouts. Nothing else could explain the tardy response of the enemy command. The rapid, silent attack of the 201st and 242d regiments caught the enemy unaware. The division broke into the town. The enemy wavered. Its units defending on the other side of the river, in the eastern suburbs, began to rapidly retreat toward the edge of the town, and this was immediately used by Col Lubyagin. The regiments of his 300th Division crossed the river close to the eastern bridges.

The Japanese units at Eho station were in a difficult situation. They were cut off from the town by the river and for this reason rushed toward the southern bridges at the suburb at Ehozhan. But the tank troops of the 77th and 257th brigades outflanked the retreating enemy and without a pause broke into Ehozhan. The sole intact crossing was in our hands. This was the second major military success during the morning of 16 August. The tank troops not only ensured convenient communications for the regiments of the XXVI Corps which were involved in street battles, but also came out in the rear of the enemy grouping which was on the defensive opposite the LXV Corps of Gen G. N. Perekrestov. We maintained radio contact with him and around 1000 hours he announced that his vanguards would soon enter Eho station from the east. At mid-day the units of Gen Perekrestov reached this station and having left crossing equipment (the pontoon-bridge battalion) for us, continued the advance along the railroad to the south, toward the city of Ninan.[3]

The situation which had developed at Mudanjiang by mid-day was in our favor however we did not deceive ourselves. The staff and I realized that the Japanese would fight for the city to the last opportunity. For this reason we had to give some thought to the immediate prospects and endeavor to immediately develop the attack. We could use the LIX Rifle Corps for this purpose.

The battle for the town developed into a fierce one, and each house and each district was fought for.

The enemy was using the internal railroad spur which crossed the city and the area of the passenger terminal as a defensive line. Here the security regiment of the 5th Japanese Army and detachments of the military police were on the defensive. Their machine gunners were in the station buildings and the hospital and kept a so-called "no-man's land" under fire, that is, a large area free of structures running down both sides of the railroad. The assault groups of Maj V. K. Golovko's battalion hit the dirt but were unable to "smoke out" the machine gunners from the solid buildings by firing light mortars. The battalion was suffering losses. Then Maj Golovko moved forward and led his men into the attack. They broke into the hospital, and while one assault group was clearing it [illegible] other headed by the battalion commander rushed up along the railroad. The stati[illegible] was stormed by a group which was led by the Komsomol organizer of the 211th Regim[illegible], Lt I. A. Komissarov.

That day all the political workers, the party organizers and Komsomol organizers of the 22d Krasnodar Rifle Division were on the front line. When the commander was knocked out, they assumed leadership of the assault groups and were the first to go into the attack. For this reason losses among these men were high.

The breakthrough of the regiments of the 22d Division of Gen Svirs to Mudanjiang from the north and their rapid advance deep into the town's districts and into the enemy rear shook all these defenses which were so long and carefully prepared. Having rapidly crossed the river on makeshift craft, the regiments of the 300th Division of Col Lubyagin took the eastern edge and began to fight their way toward the Krasnodar Rifle Troops.

At 2200 hours of 16 August, the army staff sent a combat report to the commander of the First Far Eastern Front, Mar K. A. Meretskov, that the troops of the First Red Banner Army had captured the town and railroad junction of Mudanjiang.[4] They had captured around 150 major dumps with military supplies, ammunition, fuel and food.

After the breakthrough of the Japanese defenses at Mudanjiang, the 1st Red Banner Army, without encountering any significant resistance from the crushed enemy, began to advance via Handaohezi station toward Harbin.

On 18 August we were informed that the command of the Kwantung Army had accepted the conditions of unconditional surrender. The mass surrender of the Japanese commenced. In the region of Harbin alone, 87,000 men, including 19 generals, surrendered to our army.

I would like to emphasize that along with other factors, in achieving victory an enormous role was played by the well-organized party political work in the army's units and subunits, by the correct placement of the communists and by their personal example in combat. In a word, our political workers headed by the military council member Ivan Mikhaylovich Smolikov, successfully handled all the tasks, including those which came as a surprise.

Some 25,746 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the First Red Banner Army were decorated for combat distinction in the course of the operation. Maj Gen Korniliy Georgiyevich Cherepanov and Pfc Vasiliy Stepanovich Kolesnik received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Some 14 units and formations received the honorary title of Harbin, and 30 units and formations received the Order of the Red Banner.[5]

Thus ended the combat operations of the First Red Banner Army in the hills of Manchuria.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Minister of Defense], folio 294, inv. 6980, file 79, sheet 104.

2. A portion of these forces was on the defensive opposite our left adjacent unit, the LXV Army Corps of Gen N. I. Krylov (author's note).

3. TsAMO, folio 294, inv. 6961, file 59, sheet 80.

4. Ibid., files 15-18, sheet 67.

5. Ibid., file 59, sheets 89-91

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

WARTIME OPERATIONS: NAVAL SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 55-56

[Article published under the heading "Documents and Materials" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank G. Amson: "Cooperation of Naval Artillery with the Ground Forces"]

[Text] From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, gunnery assistance from the fleets to the ground forces was widespread. The importance of naval artillery was particularly great in the defense of naval bases. The artillery carried out counter-battery bombardment, it destroyed enemy centers of resistance and covered our sea lines of communications.

Analysis of the use of shipboard artillery also disclosed shortcomings and for this reason the chief of the General Staff in April 1942 issued the following directive instructions on its use:

"To the commanders of the following fronts: Crimean, Southern, Leningrad and Karelian

"Copy: to the chief of the Main Naval Staff of the Navy

"26 April 1942, 1535 hours

"In the use of naval ships for the purpose of higher support for the flanks of the maritime armies, in the course of the war the following shortcomings have been disclosed:

"1. The artillery of the ships is used for firing against objectives outside the general plan of the offensive or defensive plan being carried out by the ground forces in the maritime sector.

"2. The tasks for the shipboard artillery are not set concretely. The targets assigned for firing on by the shipboard artillery are not coordinated with the plan for the artillery offensive by the ground forces and remain unchanged for an extended time.

"3. The ships are not covered from the air during the period they are in the firing positions, and as a consequence of this the ships are forced to carry out fire tasks

during darkness, to fire at areas and the effectiveness of such firing does little to help the successful course of hostilities on land. The isolated and ineffective use of shipboard artillery creates excessive attention and leads to the rapid wear on the guns which have a comparatively short lifespan....

"The above designated shortcomings were a consequence of poor organization of cooperation between the staffs of the ground forces and the navy.

"It is essential:

"1. In using the artillery of the naval vessels to use it as the artillery of the High Command Reserve, incorporating it in the overall plan of the artillery offensive.

"2. To oblige the senior artillery chiefs of the ground forces to promptly supply the artillery chiefs of the naval artillery with all reconnaissance data concerning the enemy which are needed for successfully carrying out the task.

"3. To provide cover for the ships from the air during the period they carry out the tasks of providing fire support to the ground forces.

"4. Not to permit the use of shipboard artillery against targets which can be neutralized and destroyed by the artillery of the ground forces.

"The shipboard artillery is to be used mainly for the neutralization and destruction of distant objectives, for destroying accumulations of enemy troops, against enemy reserves being brought up in the distant rear, that is, for carrying out those fire tasks which cannot be performed by the artillery of the ground forces.

"No 154316

"Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. Shaposhnikov

Military Commissar of the General Staff of the Red Army Bokov"

(TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 48-a, inv. 1640, file 26, sheets 139-141).

On the basis of this directive and the combat experience from the first period of the war, the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff in 1943 worked out a regulation on the combined actions of the ground forces, the Navy and river flotillas. In it particular attention was given to the preparation and execution of the tasks of fire support for the ground forces as well as to the control of the ships firing at shore targets.

The above designated documents served as the basis for improving fire support by the ships for the troops in distant combat operations.

The fleets and flotillas also worked out documents governing the use of naval artillery. Thus, on 27 April 1943, the commander of the KBF [Red Banner Baltic Fleet], Vice Adm V. Tributs, and the military council member, Rear Adm N. Smirnov, approved a plan for fire support for the troops by the ships of the Ladoga Flotilla. Let us give an excerpt from it:

"...Fire support for the flanks of the 23d and 7th combined-arms armies are to be provided by the firing of the gunboats brought to firing positions behind minesweepers with a direct escort in the move and in firing against the shore by the "MO" patrol boats and by the fighter aviation.

"Fire support for the flanks of the 67th and 54th armies is to be provided by the fire from armored launches which periodically are to change firing positions and are to be camouflaged against the background of the shore and covered by fighters and smokescreens.

"Documents for carrying out support are to be worked out by the commanders of the gunboat divisions and the detachment of the armored launches together with the ground command.

"The particular tasks for the ships are to be set by the commander of the support detachment in accord with the tasks and the fire planning table received from the commander of the formation being supported.

"The chief of artillery from the unit being supported sets the fire tasks for the support detachment.

"For the period of carrying out artillery support, communications is carried out in accord with the combat control plan."

(TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 9, file 34251/5, sheets 1-9).

In addition, the flotilla staff worked out a regulation on fire support for the flank of the army and instructions on the operation of the fire correction posts.

During the third period of the war, naval artillery was used particularly widely in January 1944 during the operation to defeat the enemy at Leningrad and Novgorod. In accord with the plan of HqSHC, the command of the Leningrad Front gave the KBF artillery the task of covering the troop movements and in cooperation with the artillery of the front to carry out artillery softening up prior to the offensive of the 2d Assault and 42d armies. It successfully carried out this mission.

We publish below an excerpt from the report on this operation approved by the commander of the KBF, V. Tributs, and the military council member, N. Smirnov, of 23 October, 1944.

"1. ...The tasks set of moving the units and equipment of the 2d Assault Army during the preparatory period and fire support for the advancing troops of the Leningrad Front in the course of the operation itself were successfully carried out by the KBF.

"2. The KBF artillery by powerful and accurate fire destroyed the basic defensive centers, it neutralized and suppressed the long-range artillery, it paralyzed the lines of communications and operation of the enemy commander's observation posts and communications centers, as well as disrupted the operation of its rear services. To a significant degree this ensured the breakthrough by the advancing troops of the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth....

"3. The tactical use of the KBF artillery was correctly organized. The use of artillery of 305-406-mm caliber for blowing up the centers of resistance with permanent field fortifications on the forward edge and in the tactical depth of the enemy defenses repays the expenditures of materiel and ammunition. The fire of these calibers fully paralyzes the enemy weapons and dependably clears the path for the advancing infantry and tanks....

"4. The organization of the KBF artillery adopted for the organization proved fully effective. Combat control was dependable and flexible, the staffs, as organs of combat control of the commanders, carried out the set missions and one should particularly note the staff of the KBF squadron.

"5. Cooperation with the army command and between the KBF artillery groups was correctly and flexibly organized. In the process of the operation all the tasks were coordinated quickly and were carried out by the KBF artillery at the designated time. Information was correctly organized with the armies. The liaison officers carried out their missions....

KBF Chief of Staff, Rear Adm Petrov"

(TsVMA, folio 9, file 12679, sheets 1-95.)

The given documents show the improved use of naval artillery for the purposes of fire support for the maritime and lakeshore flanks of ground forces.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

COMMENTS ON MIDGET SUBMARINES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 57-62

[Article published under the heading "In Foreign Armies" by Candidate of Naval Sciences, Rear Adm A. Pushkin: "Combat Operations of Midget Submarines in the Pacific Theater of Military Operations in World War II"]

[Excerpts] In the world wars, combat operations on seas and oceans assumed significant spatial scope and were conducted with great energy. From their experience it is known that the destruction of naval forces at bases always entailed difficulties and risk. For this reason the naval leadership of the belligerents endeavored to create forces and weapons which could be successfully employed at ship anchorages in coastal regions and harbors (narrows). Midget submarines were such forces. The idea of their development arose in nations having weak navies. It was felt that by operating in the coastal areas these midget subs could prevent the enemy from establishing supremacy at sea.[1]

The first manned underwater torpedo was used in 1918 by the Italians. Two swimmers fastened charges to the hull of the Austrian ship of the line "Viribus Unitis" which was at its base of Pola. On 1 November it blew up and sank.[2]

The positive experience of the combat use of such weapons (underwater "mosquitoes") in World War I contributed to their further development, including submarines with a displacement up to 100 tons. These were called midget submarines (PLSM).[3]

The given article will examine basically the operations of the midget submarines on the Pacific and Indian oceans, since they have been little examined in our literature. Although these operations did not have a great effect on the course of the war, however a study of their development and the experience of combat employment (methods, tactical procedures, organization and so forth) is of definite interest for naval art. [Here follows a description of the use of midget subs in the Pacific and Indian oceans.]

The midget submarines did not have any substantial influence on the course of armed combat. Their planned use by the Japanese in the event of a landing by Allied Troops on the Japanese islands did not occur since the defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet Armed Forces forced Japan to surrender.

Nevertheless, the midget subs demonstrated such an important combat quality as the capacity to operate where the use of other means is very difficult.

In the postwar period, in the navies of the leading capitalist countries the so-called underwater demolition and sabotage forces (PDSS) have appeared and they are based on midget submarines. As is known, in 1956-1957, they were being designed in Japan.[8] According to information in the foreign press, the United States, England, the FRG, Italy and France in the 1950's carried out research on developing new midget submarines and their series production commenced in the 1960's.

Many designs of midget submarines have already been worked out, including: the small English "Piranha," the German (FRG) MSV-75 and the type 70 and the Italian SX-506 and the SX-756W.

The foreign midget submarines are designed to carry out a broad range of combat and special tasks for aggressive purposes. For example, for invading the waters of other states, covert penetration into enemy ports and bases for the purpose of destroying war ships and vessels, for reconnaissance and sabotage. They have been designed as multipurpose and have combined weapons such as: torpedoes, mines, depth charges and containers with special equipment. There is also a version for using them as transports for demolition crews. As the former commander of the submarine forces in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm C. Lockwood, feels, the midget submarines in time will become a standard weapon of each submarine.

According to far from complete information, in the navies of the capitalist countries there are already around 100 midget submarines and this means that in the event of war they could be used in the sea and ocean theaters of war.

For this reason a study of the past experience of using such subs is not only of cognitive but also practical significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1978, p 415.

2. V. Borgese, "Desyataya Flotiliya MAS" [The Tenth Flotilla of the MAS], translated from the English, Moscow, IL, 1957, p 12.

3. V. V. Dmitriyev et al., "Podvodnyye 'Moskity'" [Underwater "Mosquitoes"], Voyenizdat, 1969, p 3.

8. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 3, 1976, p 94.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

SOCIAL CONTROL OF MILITARY COLLECTIVES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 75-79

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information" by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar SU A. Vasilevskiy: "The Primary Military Collective as an Object of Research and Social Control"*]

[Text] The questions taken up in...the book have long interested me. They have attracted my attention since the first days of military service while in the former Russian prerevolutionary army. I have already written that in those years, when I was still under 20, I, without reflecting about the social role of the army and its commanders, considered an indispensable quality of a good commander to be the ability to lead subordinates, to indoctrinate and train them, and ensure high discipline and efficiency.[1]

I have followed this view of the main purpose of a commander all my life and this, understandably, has obliged me to constantly seek out the most effective procedures and methods for controlling military collectives. In holding over many years the positions of company commander, battalion commander, assistant regimental commander and regimental commander, I in my service duties was directly involved with the primary troop collectives.... When later the party and the Soviet government entrusted me with higher and then the highest positions in the Soviet Armed Forces, at that time I did not lessen my attention to the mo t diverse aspects of controlling the primary collectives. F. Engels who, as is known, was an outstanding military theoretician, in his works repeatedly pointed out that the combat capability of the troops depends primarily upon the training level of the company and battalion. His conclusion has been affirmed by the entire history of the organizational development of the armed forces and by the entire history of wars. We, the Soviet military chiefs and generals, have always followed and continue to follow this conclusion.

---

*The article was published in the place of an introduction to the book by A. A. Belyayev, E. P. Litvinov and V. P. Maslov "Pervichnyy Voinskiy Kollektiv" [The Primary Military Collective] published in a small edition by the Higher B Command Courses of the USSR KGB in 1977. Slight changes have been made in it.

The troop subunits such as the platoon, company, the Cossack hundred, the squadron, battalion and other such, are the primary army formations. During a war and under peacetime conditions they in essence carry out the tasks which confront the armed forces as a whole. In defensive combat their main task is to hold out whatever the cost, to cause the greatest losses to the enemy and to prepare conditions for a counteroffensive; in offensive combat it is to crush the enemy defenses, to break into its battle formations and destroy its personnel and equipment. In peacetime the troop subunits carry out the main tasks of training and indoctrinating the troops, protecting and maintaining military equipment and weapons, maintaining military discipline and proper order and ensuring high combat readiness of the units and ships. Since this is the case, naturally every superior, regardless of whatever position he may hold, is obliged first of all to be concerned with the cohesiveness of the primary troop collectives and to ensure their optimum functioning.

If one turns to the history of wars, it is not difficult to see that in the armies of slaveowning, feudal and capitalist states, there has been the virtually unchallenged opinion that the high battleworthiness of the troop subunits can be achieved only by two means: by drill and by rigid, implacable discipline. Characteristically, however, as a result of the development of military affairs and the growth of self-awareness of the working masses, including those in uniform, under the influence of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, the most far-sighted representatives of the bourgeoisie have begun to realize that under the new historical conditions one can no longer count solely on drill and repression as a means of troop control.

I recall that in the book "Osnovy Boyevoy Mushtry" [Principles of Military Drill] published in Russia on the eve of World War I (certainly, I read this book significantly later), although somewhat timidly still spoke of the need to combine drill "with the spiritual indoctrination of the soldiers." Or take the admission dating to this same period by a professor at the former Alexander Military Legal Academy, Prince Drutskiy: "Previously they had hoped to create an army," he wrote, "by the terrors of punishment and the rod, but years of experience forced them to abandon this system."

Curious materials on the question of interest to us were published in " VOYENNYY SBORNIK [Military Collection] published in the Russian prerevolutionary army for officers. In the 1920's, in commanding a regiment, I became familiar with some of those materials and made notes from them. In rereading my old notes now (unfortunately, not all of them have survived), I can see that many of the authors of articles in the VOYENNYY SBORNIK correctly foresaw the development trends of military affairs under the conditions of the just beginning rapid technical progress and realized that by drill and repression, no matter how rigid it might be, the problem of putting together troop subunits could not be solved. One of them, in particular, lamented that not the drilling field where everything was under the constant supervision of the commanders but rather the field had become the basic place for training the troops and this did not help to indoctrinate subordinates in a spirit of discipline.[1] Another, in welcoming the elimination of rods, birches and whips, asserted that it would be "an anachronism to view discipline from the viewpoint of an entire compendium of punishments" and advised the authors to hold "cordial talks" with the soldiers.[2] (In parentheses I should point out that on the front I observed these "cordial" talks between the noblemen commanders such as Count F. A. Keller

with the soldiers. The latter almost openly laughed at such talks.) A third, in drawing attention to the rigid dealings of the German junior officers with soldiers and pointing to the high desertion rates in the German army, cautioned that severity could lead to the collapse of the army even in peacetime.[4] A fourth recommended that one study Bon, Tarde and other psychologists and consider the psychological aspects of controlling troop subunits.[5]

Obviously there is no need to recall the intense, carefully-planned ideological and psychological indoctrination of the soldiers (and not only the soldiers) which is conducted in the armies of the imperialist state at present. Its basic aim is to ensure blind obedience by the servicemen of these armies to the will of their commanders. For achieving this goal, the ruling classes of the imperialist states do not shy from propagandizing various misanthropic theories of racism and anticommunism among the soldiers, they preach a cult of violence and fan b. instinct. But as before in the capitalist nations drill and violence widely employed in the most diverse forms are the basic means of controlling the troops on all levels and primarily on the level of the troop subunits.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, as a new type of army, from the first days of its creation coercion played not the main but rather a secondary role in maintaining military discipline and proper order. Nor did the new army employ drill in its traditional interpretation. Our army, navy and border troops contain enormous, essentially inexhaustible opportunities for ensuring inviolable proper order, high efficiency and discipline in each troop unit and on each ship. If these capabilities are skillfully used, then there is no need for criminal repression. In the book by my good friend, the remarkable commander Hero of the Soviet Union Arm Gen Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Gorbatov, "Gody i Voyny" [Years and Wars], there are the following words which relate to the 1920's: "The guardhouse was largely empty and there was no one for the military tribunal to judge." In the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's as well as in the postwar period, I knew many troop units the guardhouses of which stood empty. Such units for a long period of time did not have major infractions of the law. They always, during the introduction of new equipment in them and during the regular transfers to the reserve of the most experienced men who had served the legally established time, maintained combat readiness and capability.

Speak[illegible] most generally, the sources for such remarkable successes of the personnel in these and many other troop units must be seen primarily in the essence of the Soviet system. Some 60 years ago our party headed by V. I. Lenin led the working people to storm the power of capital and it carried out the Great October Socialist Revolution which marked a fundamental turning point in the history of human society. It saved our motherland from the approaching catastrophe, it led it to a path of truly independent development and all-round socioeconomic and cultural progress, and made it possible to all the suppressed, fighting peoples to see their coming victory.

The Soviet state and social system which was established in our nation with the victory of Great October, in being based on socialist ownership and a socialist economic system, is the most humane and democratic system. This circumstance has had a decisive impact on the relations between the Soviet people on all levels. Characteristic of them is reciprocal cooperation and support, exceptional conscientiousness and sincerity, a highly developed feeling of responsibility for each Soviet man to society and strict mutual exactingness. This is particularly apparent on the level

of the labor collectives. The interest of each member of the labor collective in the results of labor for the good of the motherland, joint daily work, the search for the most effective methods and procedures for performing production operations, the struggle for quality, the spirit of competition and daily, hourly and minute-by-minute contact--all of this and much else spiritually brings together and enriches the members of the labor collectives, it unites them on a principled basis, it contributes to the growth of professional mastery and to the disclosure of talents, it disciplines and teaches a respectful attitude toward one another. Joint labor under socialism is a powerful factor in shaping the finer human qualities and a school of collectivism and solidarity.

This also explains the strength of the primary Soviet military collective. It lies in the humanism and democracy of the Soviet system and in the profound interest of the Soviet soldiers in properly defending the peaceful labor of their people who are building communism. Military service presupposes joint, intense, highly organized and purposeful activities by the troop collectives to carry out the very complex, diverse and difficult tasks confronting them. Due to this it teaches the men to value mutual aid and support and develops in each member of the collective a quality which is defined by the words "a feeling of fellowship." Once a feeling of fellowship has been developed in a soldier, his sense of responsibility for the assigned job increases and he is exacting for himself and for those nearby. A feeling of fellowship gives confidence to a soldier and multiplies his strength and the strength of the entire military collective.

In a word, military service based on the idea of defending one's country has objectively contributed to the spiritual drawing together of the men and to the consolidation of the troop subunits. This in turn has strengthened their combat capability. For this reason it is no accident that military formations in Russia were often called "fraternities." "For Russia and Great Novgorod from here, from the Kremlin in 1240 and 1242 the fraternities of Aleksandr Nevskiy left to defend the homeland." This inscription was discovered by archeologists on the wall of Sofia Cathedral in Novgorod. The fine word "fraternity" expressed both the spiritual community and the personal friendship of the men of Aleksandr Nevskiy. It rather accurately characterized the sociopsychological situation which existed in the fraternities of the famous Russian military leader and the situation of mutual understanding, trust, exactingness and friendship which multiplied the forces of the fraternities and was the most important source of their invincibility.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that in the armies of exploiting socioeconomic formations, there are stronger trends which disunite the men and prevent their actual cohesiveness. These trends are rooted in the very nature of the society based on private ownership of the implements and means of production and on the exploitation of man by man with its inevitable accomplices: class antagonisms, the ravaging and poverty of the masses, the caste exclusiveness of the officers, their indifference to the needs of the soldiers, the despotism of the junior officers and so forth.

Having abolished private property and having established Soviet power in our nation, the Great October Socialist Revolution created the real prerequisites for the forming of the strong military collectives and for raising their role in ensuring high combat readiness and capability of the troops. In a book by a German military officer, I think Ritter, I once read that even the brave Gauls, in going into battle,

chained themselves together. Soviet soldiers have no need to chain each other together. For their steadfastness and solidarity in combat are stronger than steel. This quality of the Soviet soldiers which they have repeatedly demonstrated to the entire world on the battlefields and in defending the state frontier integrates many component elements the most important of which are the unshakable communist conviction of the Soviet military, their wholehearted loyalty to the Soviet motherland, to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government, loyalty to the military oath, high professional skill, obedience of the law, discipline and efficiency.

Here it is essential to emphasize the crucial role of the primary military collectives and their commanders and political workers in indoctrinating the proper moral-political and military qualities in the men. he "secret" of the troop units which have high combat readiness and capability and which have eliminated major infractions of the law lies in the ability of the commanders in their work to rely on the primary troop collectives, to control them knowledgeably and ensure their optimum functioning. The mastery of this "secret" is the duty of each commander. The way to it lies through the acquiring of a certain fund of knowledge and experience.

However, we must not wait until experience is gained over time. A great deal can be done by the senior chiefs in helping the young officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] in learning to control the troop collectives and as much as possible avoid the gaining of experience by the "trial and error" method. As for theoretical knowledge, here the tenacity of each commander in mastering theory is indispensable and here there must be study, study and again study. There must also be research on the primary military collectives and their inherent social and sociopsychological processes and the search for efficient means of controlling them....

Modern-day military equipment and weapons have substantially altered the forms and methods of the combat employment of the troops and they demand their dispersion, unprecedented mobility and maneuverability in combat and high organization, steadfastness and efficiency. This has brought about an even greater rise in the role of the primary troop collectives in the training and indoctrination of the men, in their ideological and political tempering, in ensuring relations between them based on trust, mutual aid, benevolence and strict exactingness on one another, and in developing in each soldier physical hardiness and an unswerving drive to surmount all difficulties in combat training and to achieve high indicators in the mastery of military skills....

The 25th CPSU Congress which outlined a magnificent program of economic and social changes in our nation also defined the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions. In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress, it was pointed out that our party will do everything so that the Soviet Armed Forces possess all of the necessary means for carrying out their responsible task of protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and being a bulwark of universal peace.[7] An extensive program for further increasing the efficiency of political and military indoctrination of the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress was outlined by the meeting held in March 1976 at the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and in the speech given at it by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU

D. F. Ustinov. In this program a significant place has been given to raising the role of the military collectives in carrying out the tasks confronting the troop units and ships and to improving the style of troop control.

The Soviet military is working intensely on carrying out the military and political training programs, on improving their combat skills, on strengthening discipline and proper order and on raising the combat readiness and capability of the troops. However, greatest vigilance is needed. In speaking at the 16th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on 21 March 1977, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, pointed out that the reactionary forces of the old world in no way wish to accept the growth and strengthening of the new.[8] The victorious advance of the USSR and the entire commonwealth of socialist states along the path outlined by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin has aroused furious anger among the enemies of peace, democracy and socialism. Perfidious and experienced in deceit, they are ready to resort to any provocations. There can be just one response to this, that is, even greater solidarity of the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces with the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee and a rise in the political and labor activeness of the workers.

In carrying out their sacred duty of defending the world historical victories of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party, the Soviet military is adding to the glorious military traditions of our Army, Navy and Border Troops and is constantly raising its military skills. The troops are in constant readiness so as to thwart any provocations and defeat any aggressor. Here a major role is played by the troop subunits, by their primary collectives, by the party organizations and by the good sociopsychological and moral climate reigning in them. For this reason it is essential to spare no effort to further improve the methods, forms and procedures for controlling the primary troop collectives and for mastering the Leninist style of work in carrying out the tasks confronting the troops.

FOOTNOTES

1. See A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo Vsey Zhizni" [A Cause of One's Entire Life], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 17.

2. See VOYENNYY SBORNIK, No 3, 1908.

3. Ibid., No 8, 1908.

4. Ibid., No 11, 1911.

5. See Ibid., No 1, 1908.

6. [not in text]

7. See "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 83.

8. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Sovetskiye Profsoyuzy--Vliyatel'naya Sila Nashego Obshchestva" [The Soviet Trade Unions--An Influential Force of Our Society], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 20.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
8144/0892

ROLE OF MILITARY ARCHIVES IN RESEARCH WORK

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 82-85

[Article published under the heading "Historiography and Source Study" by Col O. Gurov: "On the Role of Military Archives in Scientific Research and Military History Work"]

[Text] During all his activities, V. I. Lenin devoted great attention to a study of military history. He wrote many articles on military history questions, particularly on the Civil War of 1918-1920. For the leader military history was the initial factual material which helped him disclose the origin and essence of wars, their place and role in the development of society, as well as in creating teachings about war and the army. He profoundly analyzed the statistical figures.

V. I. Lenin always resorted to military history facts for showing the validity of one or another thesis. In emphasizing the importance of studying military heritage, he at the same time was against an uncritical attitude toward it and taught that we should proceed from an analysis of a specific situation and the present state of military affairs. But Lenin urged "not to forget the basic historic tie and to view each question from the viewpoint of how a certain phenomenon arose in history, through what main stages this phenomenon passed in its development, and from the viewpoint of its development see what the given thing has presently become."[1]

A scientific approach to elaborating the problems of military history requires a detailed study of concrete material, the establishing and accumulating of military history facts, their thinking out and thorough analysis.

In our nation the publishing of the 11th of 12 volumes of "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945] and the 8th volume of the "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] was a major event. These publications are popular not only in the USSR but also abroad. Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia have begun to translate them. They have been worked out on a rich historiographic basis, and they bring out the major events of the past world war and the problems of the theory and practice of military affairs. The works have won the recognition of scholars, military

---

[1]V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 67.

specialists and all citizens interested in military history and military-technical achievements.

The scale of military history research has increased significantly and its scientific level has risen. Here a definite role has been played by the military archives. From the archival documents, scholars draw statistical data and facts for studying and disclosing various trends in the development in the forms and methods of armed combat and for analyzing and disclosing the essence of many unclear phenomena. Archival documents are the foundation for research on the problems of military history.

The basic military documents in the USSR are kept in the state archives and the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The materials of the pre-October period are largely contained at the Central State Military History Archives (TsGVIA, Moscow, No 3 2d Baumanskaya). The documents of the military units and facilities of the Soviet Army from 1918 through 1940 are kept at the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (TsGASA, Moscow, No 17 B. Pirogovskaya), and for the period of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar years, at the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense (TsAMO SSSR, Podol'sk, Moscow Oblast). As for the documentary materials of the Navy, they have been collected at the State Archives of the Navy (GA VMF, Leningrad, 36 Khalturin) and at the Central Naval Archives (TsVMA, Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast). In the archives of military medical documents at the Central Military Medical Museum of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Leningrad, No 2 Lazaretnyy Lane) are stored materials on the counts of sick and wounded as well as documents of the military medical facilities from the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Access to the documents is granted by the following officials:

1) The chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (for the documents of the chief staffs of the armed services, the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the headquarters of the military districts and fronts);

2) The deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy (to the documents of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, as well as the party commissions and party registration);

3) The chief of the Main Staff of the Navy (to the documents of the TsVMA);

4) The chief of the History-Archives Section of the General Staff (to the documents of the headquarters of armies and lower, as well as to the military documents kept in the state archives).

The use of the archival holdings is diverse. Collections of archival documents and materials as well as microfilms are produced. These are used by researchers as well as by representatives of the creative intelligentsia in preparing the documentary background for movies, radio and television. They comprise the nucleus of many exhibits in museums and rooms of military glory and are employed in the course of scientific conferences and the military patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

The publications and microfilming comprise a significant place in the work of the military archives. This is carried out, as a rule, in close contact with kindred and interested institutions. In recent years collections of documents have been prepared on the participation of the Ukraine, Moldavia, Kalininskaya Oblast, the Moscow militia and others in the Great Patriotic War. Collections of documents are being worked out on the history of Soviet-Bulgarian, Soviet-Mongolian, Soviet-Polish and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. Many of them have already been published. Documents have also been published on the history of the border and interior troops. This has significantly broadened the historiographical basis for the history of the Great Patriotic War and has contributed to the more profound elucidation of the liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In using the archives, the researchers can obtain scientific-historical information, ascertain the necessary facts and figures, select materials for a monograph, a military history work, articles, memoirs, dissertations, a report, abstract, diploma project, textbook and so forth.

Modern equipment such as punchcard machines are being introduced into the military archives. With their aid information is retrieved and processed on the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the full holders of the Order of Glory, data are accumulated on the experience of the combat employment of the armored and mechanized troops during the war years as well as the combined-arms field forces and formations, branches of troops and special troops, and the special-subject punchcard catalogs are being broadened on the operations of the various branches of troops and armed services under special conditions during the years of the Great Patriotic War. More and more frequently archival materials are used in creating films ("the Great Patriotic War," "Liberation," "Soldiers of Freedom," "Sokolovo") as well as radio and TV broadcasts on military history and military patriotic themes. As a rule, the archival documents are used in preparing a series of broadcasts over Soviet radio on the hero cities and the individual and collective feats of the soldiers. Not so long ago over television a three-installment film "Malaya Zemlya" was shown and the creators of it studied scores of files from various archival holdings. It was universally recognized and approved by a large TV audience. Of great interest are the publication of archival documents on Malaya Zemlya in the journal KOMMUNIST (No 7, 1978) on the basis of which exhibits have been prepared and successfully held at the Central Club of the Soviet Army and the Central Club of the USSR Journalists Union.

At present the archival sources are used by generals, admirals and officers who are selecting materials for military memoirs, essays and the histories of the units, ships and formations. A great deal is being done also for the purposes of clarifying data on previous servicemen related to their service in the operational army. The basic burden of providing researchers with the necessary documents rests on the collective of the TsAMO SSSR.

The scale of the activities of the military archives can be judged from the number of researchers. During the first half of 1980, around 400 persons from more than 90 cities of the Soviet Union were studying at them. They were issued over 25,000 archival files. It is a pleasure to note that 200 of them are writing monographs, memoirs and military history works and around 60 are working on dissertations. The officers involved in various planned scientific research are also working fruitfully in the archives.

The archival materials are being systematically used by the instructors of the military academies and other institutions of higher learning in preparing lectures, group exercises, theoretical conferences and dissertations.

Archival documents are assuming exceptional significance at the present stage, under the conditions of the sharp exacerbation in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. Bourgeois ideologists and their supporters of all hues, including the Chinese hegemonists and falsifiers, are endeavoring in every possible way to distort the Marxist-Leninist thesis about the international nature of the defense of the victories of socialism.

In the West many publications are coming out the authors of which endeavor to falsify the cardinal questions of the history of World War II, to play down the crucial role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, to disregard the importance of the liberation mission of the Soviet Army and at the same time to extol the role of the operations of the Anglo-American troops in the secondary theaters of war. The archival documents make it possible to correctly recreate the past, to establish the truth and unmask the invalidity of such fabrications. The active use of the materials in the military archives for the purposes of military history education and the international indoctrination of the troops has been largely aided by the close cooperation of the archives with the voluntary military-scientific societies under the garrison, district and fleet officer clubs the members of which are thousands of officers, generals and admirals in the reserves and retired and who were active participants in the Great Patriotic War.

The military archives, in possessing very rich material on the mastery and heroism of the Soviet troops shown in the struggle against the combined forces of fascism and aggression during the war years, directly influence the carrying out of military patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth in the patriotic-defense organizations, schools and on the job, as is required by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" of 19 April 1979. At the archives they are showing attention to the letters received from the participants of the All-Union Komsomol and Youth Hike Through the Sites of the Revolutionary, Military and Labor Glory of the Soviet People.

The documents of the military archives are also widely used in monument propaganda. Only after a careful study of them is a decision taken to erect memorial complexes and monuments of glory as well as memorials and obelisks. Thus, upon the assignments of the party and state bodies, the TsAMO brought out the necessary documentary materials for creating the memorials at Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd, at the sites of battles at Moscow, at the Saur Mogila Kurgan in the Donets Basin and elsewhere. This work is continuing.

On the basis of the documents of the military archives, information has been clarified for building over 50 monuments and commemorating the group feats of the Soviet military in Leningrad and Novorossiysk, Sevastopol' and Kaliningrad as well as the Panfilov and Shironin heroes and others.

The military-scientific and military history conferences are of great significance in the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel. The involvement of documents from the Great Patriotic War in the

process of working out the reports and co-reports given at such forums provides an opportunity to better disclose the development trends in military affairs and to incorporate in theoretical assessments the elements of historical experience which make it possible to draw profound conclusions on the problems of military organizational development. The military archives are providing valuable aid to the various museums and rooms of military glory in their work in the area of the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, the Army and Navy personnel and all the workers of our nation.

Archival documents are being evermore widely used in the exhibits.

The activities of the military archive collectives are great and diverse. For this reason in the interests of strengthening the scientific research and military history work, it is important to give them effective aid in organizing and further improving their special knowledge and bettering the conditions for the storage, safekeeping and use of archival documents. A considerate attitude toward the archivists, as well as toward their indoctrination, instruction, correct use and placement plays a primary role in organizing and improving the work of the archives in providing the researchers with the necessary documents and in preparing prompt and skilled replies to the requests of organizations and the letters of citizens on questions of their service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the previous war and in peacetime. All of this will help to strengthen the scientific research base of the military archives which is so essential for further improving military history work in the interests of the development of Soviet military science, satisfying the needs of the workers and activating military patriotic work among the youth of induction, preinduction and school ages on the basis of the glorious revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy which during the years of the struggle for the liberty and independence of the Soviet peoples showed great examples of military art, while their personnel set a standard of valor, skill, steadfastness, tenacity and mass heroism in the fight against Nazi Germany and militarist Japan.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

REVIEW OF BOOK ON ZIONISM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 86-88

[Review by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col V. Karmoukhov of the book "Sionizm--Pravda i Vymysly" (Zionism--The Truth and Fabrications) (a collection of articles). Translated from various languages. Second, revised edition. Moscow, Progress, 1980, 288 pages]

[Text] The world press circulated a terrible picture: a flattened motor vehicle which transported seven Lebanese citizens wounded during the bombing of the peaceful population by Israeli aviation. An Israeli tank patrol had made a document check. An 8-year-old girl did not have her identity card (!) and the 60-ton Centurion crushed the vehicle with the people.

What "inspires" the Israeli military to such crimes and what is the misanthropic ideology? A convincing example to this question has been given in the new collection of translated articles "Sionizm--Pravda i Vymysly" which is of great significance for the present-day ideological struggle against international Zionism which has concealed its true nature and aggressive essence under heaps of false assertions about the superiority of the Jews over all the peoples of the world, their territorial claims, the seizure and plundering of Arab lands and the hatching of the crazy dream of creating a "Great Israel."

The materials contained in the collection were published previously in various nations. They were written by persons of different national, political and class affiliation brought together by the noble desire to show the true face of international Zionism, one of the rapid enemies of peace, progress and friendship among peoples. Relying on new, previously unknown facts and documents, the authors, including the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party, Meyer Vilner, the member of the U.S. Communist Party Carl Bloyce, and others, have unmasked numerous crimes by the Zionists and shown their flaunting of the standards of international law and the principles of humanism and peace.

"The frontier runs where the Israeli settlements are and not where it is marked on a geographic map," stated Golda Meir (p 156). Even franker are the aggressive and misanthropic statements by the chief rabbi of the Israeli army. In an official pamphlet published by the Israeli Minister of Defense, this spiritual pastor of the Israeli soldiers explains: "When our (Israeli.--Ed.) tr[illegible] come into contact with

the civilian population during a war or a special raid (since no one can be confident that the population will not harm our troops), each man, in accord with the provisions of the Galakha (that is, the oral law.--Ed.) should kill them" (pp 282-283). And the Israeli troops with the pedantry of Nazi criminals carry out the instructions of their "spiritual" mentor.

Another accusation against Zionism is the fragments published in the collection from the French edition of a book by the Professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, I. Shahak "Racism of the State of Israel." Using concrete facts, it shows that the present state of Israel is a racist state in which "only the Jews are considered people and the non-Jews have the status of animals" (pp 185-186).

The collection gives facts of numerous misdeeds by Israeli aggressors on the Arab lands captured by them the victims of which are primarily the peaceful civilian population--the women, old persons and children. These flagrant facts of cruelty and vandalism evoke anger and indignation in all honest people.

An important place in the articles is given to showing the aggressive, anti-Soviet nature of the military policy carried out by the ruling circles of Israel and the U.S. military-industrial complex which supports them in every possible way, as well as to an analysis of the links between international Zionism and imperialism.

At the 14th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party it was pointed out that the program of the Zionist movement and its practice are based on an alliance with imperialism. Their joint efforts are aimed against the communist movement. In the Near East the Israeli Zionists were always and remain faithful allies of the imperialists and the bitter enemies of the working masses in the occupied territories. On the international scene, Zionism has been a shock detachment of imperialism in its global plans aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. In Asia, Africa and Latin America it supports the neocolonialist policy of the imperialist states (p 12).

All the Zionist parties and organizations have supported the aggressive wars started by Israel in 1956 and 1967, the first in alliance with the French and English imperialists, and the second relying on the American imperialists. The aggression had completely definite aims, primarily the elimination of the anti-imperialist, progressive regimes in the Arab countries. These wars, as Comrade M. Vilner writes, have embodied the Zionist policy of territorial expansion and the elimination of the national existence of the Arab people of Palestine which has become the basic victim of the anti-Arab policy of the ruling Zionist circles in Israel. The permanent traits of this policy are territorial expansion (any time the situation permits), discrimination and national suppression of the Arab population in Israel, nationalistic arrogance based on material support from the imperialist powers (p 14).

Here it should be pointed out that in 1980 alone, Israel received from the United States 60 war planes, including 40 F-16 type aircraft, 100 M-60 tanks, 660 armored personnel carriers and 3 missile-carrying escort vessels, and in the 1981-1982 fiscal year it has requested that Washington give it aid of 3 billion dollars.

In the struggle for the votes and the support of the Zionist lobbies of America, the former president J. Carter stated at the Democratic Convention: "I am proud that

one-half of all the aid which our nation has provided Israel during the 32 years of its existence has occurred in the period my administration has been in power."[1]

The book gives numerous materials on the ties of the Zionists with the fascists and these unmask their duplicity. Thus, the Zionist leadership repeatedly tried to establish contact with the fascist regime of Mussolini. In January 1923, just 2 months after the fascists had come to power in Italy, one of the Zionist leaders, Weizmann met Mussolini and thereby opened the way to contacts and ties between the leadership of the Zionist organization and the fascist regime of Italy. Mussolini even offered his support on the question of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. Agreement was also reached on the forming of a Zionist navy in Italy and the training of Zionist pilots in the Italian flight schools (pp 46-47).

In the spring of 1940, the Zionists were engaged in talks with the leaders of Nazi Germany. The Nazi leaders demanded direct aid from the Zionists in America so that the United States would not enter the war on the side of England. For this the Nazis offered as a Jewish homeland territory in Alaska, Rhodesia or Madagascar. The Nazi leaders were not in agreement only over the question of what sort of state this should be, agrarian or industrial (pp 69-70).

The authors of the article have focused particular attention on unmasking the true nature of the siding of Zionism with American imperialism. The interest of American imperialism in Palestine appeared after World War I, when the struggle intensified to divide up the world between the imperialist powers. In 1922, the U.S. Congress approved a resolution which stated that "the United States is in favor of creating a national center of the Jewish people in Palestine" (p 47). In following years, the interest of American imperialism in Palestine increased. It willingly used the services of the Zionist leadership in the past and uses them presently in the interests of its global strategy. The Zionists generally and the Zionist leaders of Israel, in particular, have been active supporters of American imperialism in the carrying out of its aggressive actions both in the Near East as well as in other regions of the world.

In turn, American imperialism in every possible way has supported the ruling circles of Israel in implementing their brazen policy of aggression and expansion against the Arab peoples. The Zionist rulers of Israel are continuing the policy of suppressing the Palestinian people and the policy of seizures and aggression against the Arab peoples relying on the support of the imperialist powers which are endeavoring by their help to perpetuate the Israeli-Arab conflict (p 51).

The basic calculations of the Zionist leadership come down, in the opinion of one of the authors, to the following: the better it serves the strategy of imperialism, the more imperialism needs it services, the stronger and more dependable will be the support for its particular plans by imperialism. For this reason the Zionist leaders, particularly the Israeli rulers, are everywhere zealously serving imperialism (p 53).

---

[1] PRAVDA, 9 September 1981.

The collection thoroughly discloses the broadly planned anti-soviet and anti-socialist activities of international Zionism. For many years Israel has been conducting a shameless anti-Soviet campaign. The Soviet Union is depicted as the No 1 enemy of all the Jews and primarily of Israel. The Zionist preachers poison primarily the minds of children and the youth with the venom of their propaganda. The information media in every possible way blacken Soviet reality and falsify the peace-loving foreign policy of our state. The Israeli representatives in the United Nations and other international organizations miss no opportunity to spoil the international atmosphere as much as possible and to permeate it with a spirit of anti-Sovietism.

The Zionist leaders and the Israeli rulers fear even the most insignificant rapprochement between the United States and the USSR. This is why they are particularly trying to strengthen the most extreme imperialist forces (p 55). Thus, the "chief ideologists" of the Jewish Defense League, Kahane, and certain other bosses of this organization have stated that they would be pleased to see Soviet-American relations return to the period of brinkmanship. Kahane has demanded that the United States cease "building bridges to the Russians" and has fiercely attacked a lessening of international tension (p 114).

One cannot help but agree with the prediction found in the book on the prospects for Zionist policy. In actuality, there can be no doubt that along with a weakening of the forces of imperialism, Zionist forces will also be weakened. At present, Zionism is operating under conditions when the balance of force has changed and continues to change in favor of peace, the freedom of peoples and socialism. Ultimately these changes will lead to a collapse of Zionist policy. Zionism may still have temporary successes, since temporary successes of imperialism are possible. But the general trend is toward its weakening (p 63).

In speaking about the achievements of the reviewed collection, one cannot help but point out that it is full of factual data, much of which has been published for the first time.

The Izdatel'stvo Progress has come out with an interesting book which will be of great help to the military historians and to all ideological workers in their noble activities to unmask the reactionary essence of the ideology and policy of international Zionism.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

[27]
CSO: 8144/0891

REVIEW OF BOOK ON MILITARY HISTORY RESEARCH

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 p 89

[Review by Honored Scientist of th. RSFSR, Professor and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col M. Galkin of the book "Dialektika Voyenno-Istoricheskogo Issledovaniya" (Dialectics of Military History Research) by V. T. Login, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 224 pages]

[Text] Izdatel'stvo Nauka has published the book by V. T. Login which brings out the methodological bases of military history research. It will be of help both to beginning and experienced researchers engaged in studying, generalizing and disseminating the experience of the Great Patriotic War as well as to commanders and political workers in the training and indoctrination of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. It examines various areas of military history research.

In bringing out the nature of the use of dialectical and formal logic in military history research, the author focuses attention on the particular features of employing the principles, laws and categories of dialectics in the process of understanding military events of the past and on disclosing the unity of objectivity and communist party loyalty in analyzing military aspects. Of interest is the examination of formal logical laws in studying the problems and stating the obtained results.

The book provides a sound description of military history sources as the initial stage in the scientific understanding of military history. In accord with the disclosed patterns, a scientific classification is provided of the military history sources, there is a careful and thorough examination, analysis and assessment of them, and the military history events, the logical procedures of their description, explanation and generalization are described.

The book as a whole correctly poses the question of the importance of statistical facts but they are not quite correctly interpreted. The author considers a statistical fact to be the quantitative characteristics of military events or a generalization or compendium of uniform indicators (p 146). In actuality this is not always the case. The number of subunits and units involved in a battle can scarcely be considered a statistical fact. This is nothing more than a quantitative description of an event. A statistical fact is a statistical pattern disclosed on the basis of the generalization of uniform indicators. If we, for example, say that

during a certain period of the war the depth of army operations was such and such, this will be a statistical fact. The book brings out the insufficiently elaborated but very important problem of proof and truth in military history research.

The concluding portion of the book provides a description of the class and gnosiological roots and methods of the bourgeois falsification of military history. The most perfidious method of falsification is the method formulated by A. Dulles who wrote that the misinforming of public opinion is all the more profound and effective the more the facts and concepts understood by people are used in the lie.

The general patterns given in the book for a scientific understanding of military history research and its particular features, its methodology and logic will be of indubitable aid not only to military historians but to all military personnel.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

MAILBAG OF THE 'MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL' FOR 1980

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 1, Jan 81 signed to press 22 Dec 80 pp 90-92

[Unattributed article: "Editor's Mailbag of the Journal in 1980"]

[Text] The editor's mailbag for the past year clearly reflects the basic problems being solved by the journal and which stir our readers. The authors of many letters (and the editors received more than 1,000 of them) concern military history questions and they are also interested in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. There was a particular increase incorrespondence with the editors on the eve and during the days of celebrating the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan.

Many readers in their letters have asked that we write more about the engagements and battles of the beginning period of the war and about little-known operations, that remembrances are shared about the most vivid episodes remaining in their memories, and that they tell about combat friends and their commanders and are interested in their fate. Such letters have been sent in, for example, by Majs (Ret) D. F. Fol'skiy (the town of Shchors, Chernigovskaya Oblast) and I. M. Bobrikov (Sverdlovsk), Sr Lt (Res) M. P. Shutemoin (Krasnyy Sulin, Rostovskaya Oblast), the war veterans K. V. Danchenko (Leningrad), P. Ye. Yenin (Voronezh), V. M. Zakoka (Mogocha, Chitinskaya Oblast), V. A. Kunyshev (Novocherkassk, Rostovskaya Oblast), I. I. Serdyuk (Lyubinskaya Station, Omskaya Oblast), I. F. Burmistrov (Novosibirsk) and many others.

For example, P. Ye. Yenin has stressed, the younger generation should know as much as possible about the men who bore the brunt of the fierce enemy drive during the first, most difficult days of the Great Patriotic War. Of course, such material must be assembled piecemeal as the archives scarcely have all the documents. The reports were written irregularly during the first months of the war, they were often destroyed, particularly when the threat of encirclement arose.

Many war veterans, for example, A. K. Timofeyev (Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Oblast), I. V. Goncharov (Pospelikha, Altayskiy Kray), V. N. Davidich (Kiev), K. I. Sidorov (Chelyabinsk) and others, shared their impressions about the celebration of Victory Day and made a number of proposals on conducting military patriotic work with the youth. Thus, the chairman of the Veterans Council of the 20th Rifle Division, Col (Res) V. N. Davidich, stated that the regular meeting of former fellow servicemen

on the occasion of the 35th victory over Nazi Germany was held on 6-11 May 1980 in Sochi. Certain veterans brought their children. Such meetings, he emphasized, are of great indoctrinational significance.

Various questions and proposals have been raised also by the Red Trackers of the "Poisk" [Search] Club (Lipetsk), the Young Trackers of the Tukhcharskiy Secondary School of Dagestan, the "Kibal'chish" Club of the Eighth Secondary School in Ural'sk, the 32d Secondary School of Kirov and the Chistiyskaya Secondary School (the settlement of Sasyr-Ulakhan in the Yakut ASSR), the director of the regional museum P. P. Smirnov (the town of Temnikov in the Mordovian ASSR), the school administration in the village of Belyaki, Poltavskaya Oblast, and other readers.

Interesting data were given in the letter of Maj (Res) N. A. Chumakov (the village of Maklaki, Kaluzhskaya Oblast). In battles for the village of Studenovo, Kaluzhskaya Oblast, on 17 March 1942, the commander of the 322d Rifle Division, Col P. I. Filimonov, died heroically. A strict but just commander, he was always on the front line, the veteran writes. And thus he has remained in my memory. After the war, I was able to locate his son, Engr-Maj B. P. Filimonov. How touched I was when I learned that the son had collected extensive material on the heroic deeds of the 322d Rifle Division and that he was actively involved in military-patriotic work with the youth and maintained firm ties with the trackers of the Gor'kiy schools where the division had been formed as well as with many schools in Kaluzhskaya Oblast where it had fought liberating the towns and villages of the oblast. Such patriots are sacredly carrying out their filial duty. I am proud of the son of my commander.

The readers make great demands on the editors and the authors, they point out the best, successful materials, they clarify individual statements in articles and point out errata, inaccuracies and mistakes. Thus, the reader of the journal A. N. Pegor (Orenburg) made a number of clarifications, including, for example, such as: the town of Orsha was liberated not on 27 June 1944 but on 26 June 1944; the 1st Guards Army in September 1942 was under the command not of F. I. Golikov but K. S. Moskalenko; the military rank of lieutenant general was awarded to F. I. Golikov on 4 June 1940 and not on 4 July 1940. The editors are doing more now to carefully check out all the facts, dates and figures. The reserve officers V. M. Lur'ye (Leningrad), V. I. Shapranov (Gelendzhik, Krasnodarskiy Kray) and certain other active readers maintain regular ties with the editors. In their letters, as a rule, they analyze the issues of the journal which have appeared, they clarify certain ideas of the articles and voice their proposals on improving the quality of the materials.

The engineer of the automotive enterprise A. D. Vysotskiy (Novovolynsk, Volynskaya Oblast) and others have responded positively, for example, to the appearance of the heading "You Ask and We Answer" in the journal. This shows, A. D. Vysotskiy emphasized, that the editors maintain and are broadening regular ties with the readers.

All my life on the front was linked with the 114th osbr [separate rifle brigade], writes the former scout from the separate battalion of this brigade M. I. Kosyrev (Dzerzhinsk, Gor'kovskaya Oblast). With interest I read in the February issue of 1979 the article by I. Krasnoshtanov "The 114th osbr in the Battles to Eliminate the Bridgehead to the Northwest of Rzhev." A soldier's thanks to the editor and to Gen I. D. Krasnoshtanov for a fond memory about the men of the brigade.

We, the partisans of the Moscow Komsomol-Youth Detachment imeni Gastello wrote the former secretary of the detachment Komsomol organization N. S. Makarov and G. Pavlovich (Moscow), are very grateful to the editors for publishing the article "The Operations of the Composite Regiment of the 65th Army in the Enemy Rear" (No 5, 1979). Our detachment cooperated successfully with this regiment during the battles against the Nazi invaders at the beginning of 1944.

I was deeply moved, writes P. Ya. Kozlov (Moscow), by the memoirs of V. Volkov "In the Volga Area" (No 9, 1979). I was among the designers who arrived on 19 October 1941 with the first train of the aviation plant No 18 which had been evacuated from Zaporozh'ye. My thanks to V. V. Volkov for having been able to correctly describe the construction of the group of aviation plants and about the heroic deeds of the rear workers.

The director of the people's museum in the settlement of B. Martynovka in Rostovskaya Oblast, F. P. Podgorelyy, has clarified data on the fellow countryman, the deputy platoon commander of the 664th Rifle Regiment of the 130th Rifle Division, Hero of the Soviet Union, Sgt Viktor Nikitovish Bardunov. He did not perish in battle. The physicians saved the soldier and for many years he worked in the national economy. He died in 1976. He was buried in the settlement of Krasnyy Otkyabr' in Khar'kov.

I have read the article by Yu. Loskutov "The Golden Star of a Hero" (No 4, 1979), writes the veteran of the 74th Rifle Division, Hero of the Soviet Union, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Docent, Lt Col (Res) V. M. Ignat'yev (Leningrad). Hero of the Soviet Union D. P. Nesterenko, he informs us, fought as part of the 236th Rifle Regiment but this guards regiment was part of the 74th Guards Rifle Division and not in our 74th Rifle Division.

There have been many letters in response to the article by I. Kuznetsov "On Certain Shortcomings of Books about Heroes of the Soviet Union Published by Local Publishing Houses" (No 3, 1980). The readers Yu. V. Smeyle (Rostov-na-Donu), P. D. Mushinskiy (Nikolayev), V. I. Gavrilenko (Ekibastuz, Pavlodarskaya Oblast), M. L. Chaykov (Kherson), V. V. Golikov (Stavropol'), G. N. Malitskiy (Volgograd) and others fully support the article's author that there must be a decisive struggle against any violation of historical reliability in local publications. The authors emphasized that mistakes in historical work occur, unfortunately, also in the central publishing houses such as Nauka, Mysl' and others. For example, the book "Sovetskiy Soyuz v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny 1941-1945" [The Soviet Union During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (Nauka, 1976) in the bibliographical section alone, M. L. Chaykov writes, I have noted inaccuracies on page 716 (not M. I. Azarov but I. I. Azarov), 721 (not M. V. Kovalev but M. V. Koval') and 722 (the correct name of the book is "Na Severo-Zapadnom Fronte" [On the Northwestern Front]).

My fellow servicemen and I, writes Guards Lt Col F. M. Il'chenko (Kiev), were surprised in reading the book by Yu. Ivanov "Zadaniye Osoboy Vashnosti" [A Mission of Particular Importance] (Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1979). It distorts the actions of our brigade during the taking prisoner of the staff of the 6th German Army in Stalingrad. In the journal (No 2, 1960, pp 81-95 and No 3, 1961, pp 77-84), at one time the accurate material was given on this fact. It is a great pity that the publishing house began to print the book without proper verification. Certainly the hero of

the book S. Glushenko served in the intelligence section of the 65th Army and our brigade as of November 1942 was part of the 64th Army. Paulus was taken prisoner by units of the 64th Army and not the 62d.

The books "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkaya Istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. A Concise History] (Voyenizdat, 1st edition, 1965, pp 408-409 and 2d edition, 1970, pp 384, 385) and "Boyevoye Bratstvo" [A Military Fraternity] by V. A. Muradyan (Voyenizdat, 1978, p 256), writes A. V. Zakharov (Magnitogorsk), contain a photo of Soviet soldiers raising the Red Banner over liberated Budapest. The photo is wrongly dated 1944. In the photo are soldiers of our unit, the 1405th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Division of the High Command Reserve, Sr Sgt Yevgeniy Ivanovich Kosterov and Jr Sgt Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Portyakov. The photograph was taken in February 1945 and not in 1944. The publishing houses must rectify this mistake. Incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 4 February 1970 published a note by V. Sukhodol'skiy and the same photograph with the caption: "Budapest Liberated! The camera of the war correspondent Ye. Khaldey has brought us this feat." And this was, the veteran emphasized, in February 1945 and not in 1944.

On the occasion of the celebrating of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo, the editors have received numerous letters with various requests, such as: to more widely take up this historic event, to tell about the system of rewards for the outstanding Russian soldiers, and to publish more materials not only about Soviet military leaders and generals but also about the leaders of the Russian army and about the traditions and military comradeship in previous times. Such letters have been sent, for example, by Capt (Res) R. A. Sushko (the settlement of Chul'tin, Magadanskaya Oblast, A. V. Shevarev (the settlement of Yalva, Donetskaya Oblast), A. T. Afanas'yev (Belgorod), Ye. N. Morozov (the town of Gubkin, Belgorodskaya Oblast) and others.

A number of readers such as A. M. Savinov (the Sen'kovskiy Farm, Volgogradskaya Oblast), V. S. Baryshev (Kursk), I. I. Tul'skiy (Balashov, Saratovskaya Oblast), P. M. Prokopenko (Novomoskovsk, Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast) and others, have complained about the departments of Soyuzpechat' [Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications] and have alerted the editors to the fact that certain local postal departments refuse to take subscriptions for VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL or deliver the publications subscribed to irregularly.

On this question the editors have repeatedly reminded the readers of the following. Subscriptions to VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL should be accepted by the Soyuzpechat' departments. As for complaints about delayed delivery of periodicals subscribed to, including this journal, one should turn first of all to the local communications departments. The editors are not concerned with the subscriptions to and distribution of the journal. These functions are carried out by the publishing house of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (the distribution section) where the journal is printed. For this reason, all correspondence concerning subscriptions and the delivery of the journal should be sent to the publishing house at the following address: 123826, GSP, Moscow, D-317, Khoroshevskoye Highway 38. The editors forward all letters received on the given questions to the publishing house.

Letters continue to be received with requests to provide information on new books and to help in acquiring them.

We would remind the readers that the back cover provides information on the publishing of new books on military and military history subjects at the various publishing houses and provides brief annotations. But the distribution of the books is the concern of the stores "Military Book," "Military Book by Mail" and others. The addresses of the stores "Military Book by Mail" have been published in our journal (No 6, 1979, p 91).

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981

10272
CSO: 8144/0892

END